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Abstract
This paper studies inter-trade durations in the NASDAQ limit order market and finds that inter-trade
durations in ultra-high frequency have two modes. One mode is to the order of approximately 10−4
seconds, and the other is to the order of 100 seconds. This phenomenon and other empirical evidence
suggest that there are two regimes associated with the dynamics of inter-trade durations, and the regime
switchings are driven by the changes of high-frequency traders (HFTs) between providing and taking
liquidity. To find how the two modes depend on information in the limit order book (LOB), we pro-
pose a two-state multifactor regime-switching (MF-RSD) model for inter-trade durations, in which the
probabilities transition matrices are time-varying and depend on some lagged LOB factors. The MF-
RSD model has good in-sample fitness and the superior out-of-sample performance, compared with some
benchmark duration models. Our findings of the effects of LOB factors on the inter-trade durations help
to understand more about the high-frequency market microstructure.
JEL classification: G11, G19, C41, C58
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1. Introduction
In the last two decades, there has been a rapid development of algorithmic trading and high-frequency
trading in financial markets. The evolution of the market from human involvement to computer control,
from operating in time frames of minutes to time scales of microseconds, has changed the market in a
fundamental way (O’Hara (2015)). In this paper, we document a bimodal phenomenon that is prevalent
✩All co-authors agree with the contents of the manuscript. We thank to the National Science Foundation, DMS-1612501
for financial support. Declarations of interest: none.
∗Corresponding author: Xinyun Chen, Institute of Data and Decision Analytics, The Chinese University of Hong Kong,
Shenzhen, 2001 Longxiang Road, Longgang District, Shenzhen, China, 86-0755-23517025.
Email addresses: zhicheng.li@hnu.edu.cn (Zhicheng Li), xing@ams.sunysb.edu (Haipeng Xing),
chenxinyun@cuhk.edu.cn (Xinyun Chen)
1Zhicheng Li and Haipeng Xing are equally contributed as the first author.
Preprint submitted to Elsevier December 3, 2019
in the distributions of inter-trade duration for stocks listed in the NASDAQ limit order market. The
two modes are significantly different in their scales: one is of the order of 10−4 seconds, and the other
is of the order of 100 seconds. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to document such a
phenomenon in high-frequency duration data. This phenomenon, together with other empirical evidence,
suggests that there are two regimes associated with the dynamics of inter-trade duration, and the regime
switchings, therefore, reflects the dynamics of the market microstructure in a high-frequency world.
To better understand the bimodal phenomenon, we propose a two-state multifactor regime-switching
duration (MF-RSD) model with transition probability matrices depending on the information in the limit
order book. We study the properties of the model, including the ergodicity, bimodality, and exogeneity,
and use the expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm to make an inference on the model parameters.
Simulation studies validate our estimation method and show that the MR-RSD model can successfully
generate the bimodal distribution of inter-trade durations. Then, we use the proposed model to study
the inter-trade durations in the NASDAQ limit order market. The results shows that the MF-RSD
model not only fits the data well and but also has a good out-of-sample performance in predicting the
inter-trade durations. We use 5000 in-sample data to estimate the model parameters and then do 1-
step-ahead forecasting of the next inter-trade duration for each single stock. A benchmark comparison
with some classical duration models, such as the autoregressive conditional duration (ACD) model by
Engle and Russell (1998) and the Markov-switching multifractal inter-trade duration (MSMD) model by
Chen et al. (2013), shows that the our-of-sample performance of our MF-RSD model is better than that
of the other two in predicting the arrival time of the next trade.
We have analyzed the underlying regimes that are estimated from the MF-RSD model and find
that these two regimes are related to the endogenous liquidity provision and consumption of HFTs.
Specifically, we use the permanent price change and the realized price spread to represent the profit of
taking and providing liquidity, and see their relationship between the underlying regimes. Our results
show that the profit of taking liquidity is large when the market in the short-duration regime and the
HFTs are probably using aggressive trading strategies, while in the long-duration regime when the HFTs
mainly act as the passive market makers, the profit of providing liquidity is relatively large. Moreover,
we regress the short-term price change on the regime levels and the regime-switching probabilities and
find that a large price change happens in a short time after the short-duration regime, and there will be a
stronger price movement if the market just switches from the long-duration regime to the short-duration
regime. This result suggests that the HFTs change the trading strategy to taking liquidity because they
foresee that a large price change is going to occur subsequently.
We also study some economic hypotheses in the market microstructure theory by applying the MF-
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RSD model to 25 Nasdaq stocks in a whole month. In particular, we investigate the sensitivity of the
transition probabilities of inter-trade durations in the MF-RSD model to various LOB variables and
summarize which types of market information the traders or their algorithms learn from and react to in
the LOB. Most of the results are consistent with the existing findings in the literature. For instance, 1)
order book depth imbalance is an indicator for price movement and a large depth imbalance would lead
HFTs to actively trade for earning a profit, which causes short inter-trade durations; 2) HFTs are more
likely to provide liquidity as market makers when price spread is large. At that time, market orders are
initiated by non-HFTs and the inter-trade duration would be more likely in the long-duration regime;
and 3) a large trade volume reflects a strong trading willingness on one side of the market, which is a
signal of informed trading. Therefore, HFTs would actively follow up and trade when they observe the
volume of the last trade is very large.
Besides, several new findings are obtained. First, the impact of order book depth imbalance on the
regime switchings of inter-trade durations is significant (positive for inter-trade durations switching from
the long-duration regime to the short duration regime and negative for the opposite direction) mostly for
the stocks whose price spread is tight, while it is not obvious for the stocks whose spread is slack. This is
because the depth imbalance between best ask and best bid is only informative for price movement when
the price spread between them is small. Second, the effect of price spread is asymmetric. A large price
spread tends to keep inter-trade duration stay in the long-duration regime if the preceding inter-trade
duration is long. However, a large price spread is not a significant signal which leads the inter-trade
duration to switch into the long-duration regime from the short-duration regime. Third, an increase
in price spread, which is contemporaneously associated with a change in mid-price, is shown to have a
significant effect on the regime switching of inter-trade durations, i.e., it is significantly negative for inter-
trade durations switching from the long-duration regime to the short-duration regime and significantly
positive for inter-trade durations switching from the short-duration regime to the long one.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the related literature. Section
3 discusses the data we use and provides the empirical facts of inter-trade durations, in particular, the
bimodal distribution of inter-trade durations. In Section 4 we introduce our MF-RSD model and discuss
the model’s implied properties. The estimation method and a simulation study are also given in Section
4. In Section 5 we implement the empirical analysis of the NASDAQ limit order market and summarize
the main findings. Section 6 gives our concluding remarks.
2. Related literature
Over the past twenty years, many financial duration models have been proposed. Most of them
aim to capture the empirical properties of inter-trade durations. One pioneering work is the ACD
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model by Engle and Russell (1998), which expresses the conditional expectation of duration as a linear
function of past durations and past conditional expectations of durations, and successfully explains the
observed clustering effect of inter-trade durations. After that, many varieties of ACD extensions were
developed, such as the logarithmic ACD model by Bauwens and Giot (2000), the threshold ACD model
by Zhang et al. (2001), the Markov-switching ACD model by Hujer et al. (2002) and the stochastic
conditional duration (SCD) model by Bauwens and Veredas (2004). These models can generate a rich
collection of nonlinear dynamics that fit different duration series. Recently, Chen et al. (2013) proposed
the MSMD model, in which the stochastic intensity can be decomposed into multiple fractals and each of
them follows a distinct hidden Markov process, capture the long memory property of inter-trade durations
that has been discussed in both the theoretical and applied literature (Jasiak, 1999; Diebold and Inoue,
2001; Deo et al., 2010).
Another strand of papers considers other variables’ effects on the dynamics of inter-trade durations
by incorporating them into the modeling, which shed light on our work. For instance, Engle (2000) and
Bauwens and Giot (2003) have jointly modeled the inter-trade durations and other events of interest, such
as the price process. The MF-RSD model in our paper has a similar spirit as the regime-switching model
in Diebold et al. (1994), and we link the regimes of inter-trade durations with the LOB variables via time-
varying transition probabilities. The method of making the Markov transition matrix time-varying and
dependent on some variables is also employed in Kim et al. (2008), Kang (2014), and Chang et al. (2017),
while they further considered and addressed a potential endogeneity problem in which the innovations
in determining regime switching are possibly correlated with the observed time series.
Our work is also built on some works which study information learning in financial markets. In
traditional market microstructure theory, traders learn information about security from market data, es-
pecially the trade-related information (Kyle, 1985; Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Hasbrouck, 1991). How-
ever, in the high-frequency world, the basic unit of market information becomes limit orders rather than
trades (Hautsch and Huang, 2012; O’Hara, 2015; Lo and Hall, 2015). Many papers have studied the in-
formativeness in the LOB both empirically and theoretically. Harris and Panchapagesan (2005) showed
that the limit orders in the NYSE are informative about price changes and that NYSE specialists would
use this information to provide liquidity. Cont et al. (2014) investigated the price impact of order book
events using NYSE TAQ data and found that price changes are driven by the order book imbalance.
Lipton et al. (2013) and Cartea et al. (2018) studied the informativeness of order book imbalance in
detail and found that it is a good predictor for the arrival of trades. Recently, Aliyev et al. (2018) build
a market microstructure model in which the liquidity providers not only learn about the fundamental
value of the asset but also learn about the extent of informed tradings through order flow imbalance.
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The model theoretically explains why order imbalance sometimes destabilizes markets and provides more
understanding on the dynamic process of how markets digest order imbalance.
One more strand of research related to our paper focuses on HFTs’ trading strategies and the influ-
ences of LOB factors on them. Some studies (Menkveld, 2013; Hagströmer and Nordén, 2013; Li et al.,
2005) mentioned that a significant proportion of high-frequency traders (HFTs) employ market-making
strategies and, consequently, are very sensitive to the transient fluctuation in market liquidity. On the
other hand, some papers (Brogaard et al., 2014; Staff, 2013) pointed out that HFTs would also use ag-
gressive directional strategies when they anticipate the direction of order flow or price movement in the
short run. Furthermore, several studies have shown that HFTs switch the trading strategies between
supplying liquidity and consuming liquidity according to different LOB statuses. For example, Carrion
(2013) found that HFTs are good at timing and hence provide liquidity when the price spread is large
and take liquidity when the spread is small. Goldstein et al. (2018) showed that HFTs condition their
strategy on order book imbalance, i.e., they supply liquidity on the thick side of the order book and
demand liquidity on the thin side. Van Kervel and Menkveld (2019) found that HFTs trade with large
institutional orders, i.e., they initially lean against these orders but eventually change direction and take
a position in the same direction as the most informed institutional orders. Recently, Foster et al. (2019)
used a new market microstructure model to explore a fragile liquidity when HFTs switch from liquidity
provision to liquidity consumption on the basis of unexpected information signals.
3. Data and empirical properties
3.1. Data
Our data are downloaded from LOBSTER (https://lobsterdata.com/), which provides high-quality
LOB data for all NASDAQ stocks since June 2007, based on NASDAQ’s Historical TotalView-ITCH
data. LOBSTER simultaneously generates two files. One is a ‘message’ file, which contains indicators
for the type of event causing an update of the LOB in the requested price range, with decimal precision
in nanoseconds (10−9 second). The other file is an ‘order-book’ file that records the evolution of the
LOB up to the requested number of levels at the time when the ‘message’ file is updated. Through the
‘message’ file, we can easily calculate the time length between two consecutive trades, i.e., the inter-trade
duration. And from the ‘order-book’ file, we are able to construct various LOB variables.
The sample period of our study is January 2013, which contains 21 trading days, and we have
randomly selected 25 stocks from the NASDAQ-100 index with various market capitalizations. A simple
description of these selected stocks is presented in Table 10 in the Appendices. Because the frequency
of our data is ultra-high, and we are particularly interested in the intra-day dynamics of inter-trade
durations, we will analyze each stock in each trading day separately. To give a clear illustration, we
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summarize our results for the 25 stocks but provide detailed results for the Microsoft Corporation (MSFT)
in the rest of our paper.
3.2. Empirical properties
In Figure 1, we first plot the series of MSFT inter-trade durations on January 2nd, 2013.2 There
are more than 6000 inter-trade durations on that day. Some of them are extremely short and in the
order of 10−6 seconds, and some of them are very long and in the order of 100 seconds. We perform a
histogram of these inter-trade durations in the first subplot of Figure 2, which shows a heavy tailedness
and that the majority is less than seconds. In fact, the inter-trade durations that are less than 1 second
account for 65% of the total share. Hence, in the second subplot of Figure 2, we scrutinize the inter-trade
durations by checking the histogram of their common logarithms and find a bimodal distribution with
two distinct modes. Moreover, the inter-trade durations of the remaining 24 stocks also exhibit similar
bimodal distributions, and we will give a detailed discussion in the next subsection.
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Figure 1: The series of MSFT inter-trade durations on January 2nd, 2013. The horizontal axis is the chronological order
of the durations, and the vertical axis records the duration length. The inter-trade durations are adjusted for calendar
effects.
The bottom left panel of Figure 2 presents an exponential duration quantile-quantile (Q-Q) plot for
the MSFT inter-trade durations, which indicates a nonexponential duration distribution with a long
right tail and that the distribution is over-dispersed (i.e., the standard deviation exceeds the mean),
in contrast to the equality that would be obtained if the trade events follow a classical point process
and the durations were exponentially distributed (Yang et al., 2017). In particular, the mean of MSFT
2As the inter-trade duration series exhibits a significant intra-day calendar effect, which will be elucidated in Section V,
the data that we use throughout the paper are the adjusted inter-trade durations that have been adjusted by the intra-day
calendar effect.
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Figure 2: Some empirical facts of MSFT inter-trade durations on January 2nd, 2013. Top left: histogram of the inter-trade
durations. Top right: histogram of the common logarithms of inter-trade durations. Bottom left: the exponential duration
Q-Q plot for the sample durations. Bottom right: the first 300 inter-trade durations.
inter-trade durations is 4.07 seconds, while the standard deviation is 9.54 seconds. Another empirical
property of inter-trade durations is the clustering effect, which has been discussed in Engle and Russell
(1998), Jasiak (1999), and Lai and Xing (2008, Section 11.2.3). Here, we illustrate this effect by showing
a random sample of 300 consecutive inter-trade durations in Figure 2, from which we can see that the
clustering effect appears in a manner in which short (or long) inter-trade durations are followed by short
(or long) inter-trade durations.
3.3. Bimodal distribution
We have investigated the distributions of inter-trade durations for all 25 stocks in our sample. Figure
3 shows the histograms of their common logarithms,3 and they all exhibit a similar bimodal pattern. To
locate the two modes, we fit these empirical inter-trade duration distributions by a mixture of inverse
Gaussian distributions. The results are plotted in Figure 4, from which we can see that the left modes
are approximately 10−4 s, and the right modes are located between 10−1s and 101 s. To the best of our
3It plots the histograms for the calendar-effect-adjusted inter-trade durations on the same trading day, i.e., January 2nd,
2013. In the Appendices, we also provide the histograms for the raw inter-trade durations and the aggregated inter-trade
durations in one month. They all show bimodal distribution.
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knowledge, our paper is the first to document such a phenomenon in high-frequency duration data. This
newly found bimodal distribution of inter-trade durations, together with the clustering effect we have
shown, suggest that there may be two regimes associated with the dynamics of inter-trade durations,
corresponding to the quick and slow trading periods.
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Figure 3: Histograms of the common logarithms of the inter-trade durations for 25 NASDAQ stocks on January 2nd, 2013.
The order from left to right and from top to bottom is consistent with their alphabetical order, which is presented in Table
10.
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Figure 4: Estimated two modes of the distribution of the inter-trade durations for 25 NASDAQ stocks.
Based on Hasbrouck and Saar (2013), which shows that the high-frequency trading firms have effective-
latency in milliseconds by using NASDAQ data in the year 2007, we think that the clustering of very
short inter-trade durations (most of the time below 10−1 s) is caused by HFTs. Moreover, according to
some literature mentioned in Section 2 (Brogaard et al., 2014; Carrion, 2013), we conjecture that the
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regime switchings between the long inter-trade durations and the short inter-trade durations are driven
by HFTs’ behaviors of changing trading strategies for profitability. When the market is relatively stable,
HFTs mainly use market making strategies to earn profit from the price spread between the best ask
and the best bid.4 At that time, trades are mostly initiated by non-HFTs and the time interval between
two trades would be relatively long. While when HFTs receive some signal that probably indicates a
short-term price movement, they may switch to aggressive trading strategies and trade in the direction
of price movement to gain profit. Consequently, the market enters a regime in which HFTs consume
liquidity and the inter-trade durations become very short.
4. Multifactor Regime-Switching Duration Model
4.1. Model specification
Given the empirical properties and the bimodal distribution of inter-trade durations, we propose the
following multifactor regime-switching duration (MF-RSD) model with two hidden states. Let ti be the
calendar time for the i-th trade in a trading day for one particular stock, where t0 < t1 < · · · < tn and
t0 is the opening time for the market. The i-th inter-trade duration is defined as
yi = ti − ti−1,
and there are two regimes for the inter-trade durations. Under each regime, yi is an i.i.d. random variable
drawn from a prespecified distribution, i.e.,
yi ∼

f1(y;θ1) if si = 1,
f2(y;θ2) if si = 2.
(1)
si is a two-state Markov chain with a probability transition matrix
Pi =
 1− P12,i P12,i
P21,i 1− P21,i
 ,
in which Pjk,i = P (si = k|si−1 = j) is the transition probability from state j to state k (where j, k = 1, 2
) for the i-th trade.
We think the transition probabilities in our model are time-varying and depend on some exogenous
variables. Denote xi−1 the vector that contains some lagged variables which have been realized on or
before the (i− 1)-th trade, and we concretely assume that the Pjk,i satisfies the following logistic forms,
log
P12,i
1− P12,i
= βT12xi−1, log
P21,i
1− P21,i
= βT21xi−1. (2)
4Sometimes HTFs’ profit is supplemented by a rebate from exchange for resting liquidity.
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Hence, multiple factors can be incorporated into the model to consider their effects to the regime switch-
ings of inter-trade durations. In our study, we mainly focus on the impact of LOB factors on the dynamics
of inter-trade durations. Furthermore, considering the range of inter-trade durations and the simplicity
of estimation, we assume that the distribution fk(y) (k = 1, 2) is inverse Gaussian (IVG). Specifically,
assume that conditional on state k, the probability density function for yi is as follows:
f(yi|si = k) =
(
λk
2πy3i
) 1
2
exp
(
−
λk(yi − µk)
2
2µ2kyi
)
k = 1, 2, (3)
where µk and λk are the respective mean and shape parameters for two IVGs. Suppose that si = 1
corresponds to the short-duration regime, and we should have µ1 < µ2.
Compared with other inter-trade duration models, our MF-RSD model has several advantages in
modeling high-frequency duration data. First, it uses a parsimonious structure to directly capture the
observed bimodal distribution and clustering of inter-trade durations, which helps us to understand the
dynamics of market more intuitively. Second, by introducing the covariates that potentially determine
the evolution of inter-trade durations, we can improve the model’s predictive power by using the values
of covariates that are realized before the i−th inter-trade. Finally, given the identified relationships
between the covariates and the arrival time for trades, the MF-RSD model can also be used to test some
economic hypotheses on the limit order market.
4.2. Implied properties
Here we study some implied properties of the MF-RSD model. We begin by showing the stationarity,
ergodicity, and over-dispersion. Then, we present the conditions under which the MF-RSD model can
generate the bimodality. Finally, we discuss the rationality of assuming that the covariates that determine
the regime switchings of inter-trade durations are exogenous.
4.2.1. Stationarity, ergodicity, and over-dispersion
If we have the factor series xi is a stationary sequence in a compact set, by the Theorem 5.5 of
Orey et al. (1991), we can conclude that the underlying regime state si for inter-trade duration is sta-
tionary and ergodic in the sense that limi→∞ P (si = k|s0 = j) → πk for j, k ∈ {1, 2}, with πk ≥ 0 and∑
k πk = 1. In particular, π = (π1, π2)
′ satisfies that πP = π, P = E[P(xi)].
Moreover, let s∗ follows the stationary distribution of si, then we can write the stationary distribution
of y∗ as y(s∗). Denote the random variable y(k) ∼ f(θk) and define the dispersion dk =
Var(y(k))
E[y(k)]2 .
Suppose that E[y(k)] are not equal for k = 1, 2. Then we have the dispersion of y∗ that, d = Var(y
∗)
E[y∗]2 >
10
mink dk. Because
Var(y∗) = Var(E[y∗|s∗]) + E[Var(y∗|s∗)] > E[Var(y∗|s∗)]
= E[ds∗E[y
∗|s∗]2] ≥ (min
k
dk) · E[E[y
∗|s∗]2] ≥ (min
k
dk) ·E[y
∗]2.
The last inequality follows the Jensen’s Inequality. Hence, if the individual f(θk) already has over-
dispersion, the stationary distribution of y∗ must be over-dispersed.
4.2.2. Bimodality
A bimodal distribution mostly arises as a mixture of two different unimodal distributions; however,
certain requirements need to be met. According to the Theorem 2 in Došlá (2009) which studies a
mixture of two general unimodal densities, we have derived the following proposition for a mixture of
two IVGs:
Proposition 1. Let p be the mixture ratio of two IVGs, i.e., g(y) = p·f(y;µ1, λ1)+(1−p)·f(y;µ2, λ2), p ∈
(0, 1). Define the modes of two IVGs as M1 and M2 (M1 < M2), and Nk = µk
[
−
(
1+
9µ2
k
4λ2
k
) 1
2 − 3µk2λk
]
for
k = 1, 2. We further define a function of y as
R(y) =
µ21λ2 − µ
2
2λ1
2µ21µ
2
2
−
λ2 − λ1
2y2
−
1
y −N2
+
1
y −M1
+
1
y −N1
+
1
M2 − y
. (4)
Then, g is bimodal if and only if the followings are satisfied:
1. Between the interval (M1,M2), there is a y
⋆ that makes R(y) < 0.
2. There exist roots y1 and y2 of equation R(y)=0 such that M1 < y1 < y2 < M2. Define
1
pk
= 1 +
(
λ1
λ2
) 3
2
(
µ2
µ1
)2
(yk −M1)(yk −N1)
(M2 − yk)(yk −N2)
exp
[(
λ2
2µ22
−
λ1
2µ21
)
yk +
λ2 − λ1
2yk
+ C
]
,
where C = 2µ1µ2(λ1µ2 − λ2µ1) and k = 1, 2. The mixture ratio p should be in the range (p1, p2).
The proof for Proposition 1 is given in the Appendices. In our MF-RSD model, the above conditions
are easy to be satisfied. The stationary probability for si = 1 is the mixture ratio p. The IVG under
the short-duration regime has a smaller mode M1. Specifically, we can assume µ1 < µ2 and λ1 < λ2
5.
Hence, when y is between M1 and M2 (it is certainly greater than N1 and N2, which are negative), R(y)
in (4) is very likely to be negative, especially when µ1 << µ2. Moreover, as in (4), limy→M1 R(y) = +∞
and limy→M2 R(y) = +∞, R(y) will first decrease to a negative value from M1 to y
⋆ and increase back
to positive infinity when y approachesM2. Therefore, there must be two roots for the equation R(y) = 0
in the interval (M1,M2), which are y1 and y2. The mixture ratio p, which is the stationary probability
for si = 1, should be in the range (p1, p2).
5They are consistent with our empirical results
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4.2.3. Exogeneity
In our MF-RSD model, we assume that the covariates that drive the dynamics of inter-trade durations
are exogenous. This assumption is reasonable in the following two senses.
First, according to Hautsch (2011), the event probability of a point process N(t) depends on infor-
mation that is (at least instantaneously) known prior to t. If variables are known and constant prior to
an event i , we call them time-invariant covariates, and they can be considered weakly exogenous. Con-
versely, the time-varying covariate process x(t) can continuously change between two consecutive events.
To be weakly exogenous for yi, the process x(t) must be càdlàg with xN˘(t)+1 = x(ti−1) for all t with
ti−1 < t ≤ ti. In our case, the duration event yi is defined as yi := ti−ti−1, and Pjk,i = P (si = k|si−1 = j)
represents the switching probability for the underlying state of event i changing from j to k (here,
j, k ∈ {1, 2}). Thus, the factors xi−1 that have been realized on or before ti−1 can be considered weakly
exogenous to the occurrence of event i.
Second, if we think the factors xi−1 which represent the LOB information up to (i− 1)-th trade are
timely revealed to market participants, especially to the HFTs. Then, their actions are timely made
conditional on the market information. As the occurrence of trade is triggered by just one action of a
single trader, the covariates xi−1 that were realized on or before the (i− 1)-th trade can be considered
as exogenous to the decision process of the market participant who initiates the i-th trade.
4.3. Estimation
4.3.1. EM algorithm
The direct maximization of the likelihood function of the observations is difficult to implement,
as we cannot observe the underlying states si and {si}
n
i=1 has 2
n possible realizations. Hence, we
adopt the standard expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm. In the E-step, given the information of
x1:n = {xi−1}
n
i=1 and the model’s old parameters Θ
(m) (m = 1, 2, . . . is the number of iterations), the
expected complete-data log-likelihood is
Es1:n [l(y1:n,s1:n|x1:n,Θ
(m))]
=P(s1 = 1|F)[log f(y1|θ1) + log ρ] + P(s1 = 2|F)[log f(y1|θ2) + log(1− ρ)]
+
n∑
i=2
{
P(si = 1|F) log f(yi|θ1) + P(si = 2|F) log f(yi|θ2) (5)
+ P(si = 2, si−1 = 1|F)β
T
12xi−1 − P(si−1 = 1|F) log(1 + e
βT12xi−1)
+ P(si = 1, si−1 = 2|F)β
T
21xi−1 − P(si−1 = 2|F) log(1 + e
βT21xi−1)
}
.
where F represents information generated by {xi, yi}
n
i=1 and old parameters Θ
(m). ρ is the conditional
stationary probability for state 1, i.e., ρ = P(s1 = 1|F). The conditional posterior distributions P(si =
12
2, si−1 = 1|F), P(si = 1, si−1 = 2|F), P(si−1 = 1|F), and P(si−1 = 2|F) can be calculated using the the
forward-backward algorithm 6.
Then, in the M-step, we update the model parameters by maximizing the expected log-likelihood 5,
Θ(m+1) = argmax
Θ
Es1:n [l(y1:n,s1:n|x1:n,Θ
(m))]. (6)
We repeat the E-step and M-step until the model parameters converge, i.e.,
||Θ(m+1) −Θ(m)|| ≤ tolerance
By plugging the density function (3) into the expected log-likelihood function (5), the maximization step
(6) yields the following analytical expressions for the model parameters 7:
µ̂k =
n∑
i=1
yi · P(si = j|F)
n∑
i=1
P(si = j|F)
, λ̂k =
µ2k
n∑
i=1
P(si = k|F)
n∑
i=1
(yi − µk)
2
yi
· P(si = k|F)
, k = 1, 2, (7)
and the regression coefficients βˆ12, βˆ21 satisfy the following equations:
n∑
i=2
[
P(si = 2, si−1 = 1|F)−
eβˆ
T
12xi−1
1 + eβˆ
T
12xi−1
· P(si−1 = 1|F)
]
xi−1 = ~0 (8)
n∑
i=2
[
P(si = 1, si−1 = 2|F)−
eβˆ
T
21xi−1
1 + eβˆ
T
21xi−1
· P(si−1 = 2|F)
]
xi−1 = ~0. (9)
4.3.2. Estimation consistency
Given the assumption that the covariates xi−1 are exogenous to the duration process and inter-trade
duration yi is i.i.d conditional on the underlying state si, the maximum likelihood (MLE) will obtain
consistent estimators, and they asymptotically converge to the true parameters. However, we adopt the
EM algorithm instead of directly maximizing the likelihood because of the complexity in constructing
the log-likelihood function in the presence of underlying hidden states. Hence, the estimation consistency
relies on the convergence of the EM estimator to the global maximizer of the log-likelihood function.
Define the log-likelihood for the observed data as L(Θ) = L(Y |X,Θ), in which Y := y1:n and
X := x1:n. Then, the MLE estimator directly maximizes L(Θ), and the EM algorithm iteratively
increases the value of L(Θ) at each step by maximizing the expected complete-data log-likelihood in (6),
which can be redefined as
Θ(m+1) = argmaxQ(Θ|Θ(m))
6Diebold et al. (1994) has shown the steps to calculate and implement this forward-backward algorithm.
7Detailed derivations are shown in the Appendices.
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According to Wu et al. (1983), if the unobserved complete-data specification can be described by an
exponential family, the function Q(ψ|φ) is continuous in both ψ and φ. Then, the limits of the EM
sequence are the stationary points (local maxima) of the log-likelihood L(Θ). This condition obviously
holds, as the IVGs belong to the exponential family and the transition probabilities are in logistic form.
Moreover, if L(Θ) is unimodal, the EM estimator converges to the global maximizer of L(Θ).
4.3.3. Standard errors of the estimators
The variance-covariance matrix of estimators is not a byproduct of the EM algorithm. To obtain
that, we use the supplement EM (SEM) method proposed by Meng and Rubin (1991). The SEM method
employs the fact that the rate of convergence of the estimators in the EM is governed by the fractions
of missing information that would increase the variability of the estimation. In particular, the desired
observed variance-covariance matrix V , which is also the inverse of the observed information matrix, can
be expressed as the sum of the covariance matrix of the expected complete-data, i.e., I−1EC, and a variance
inflation part ∆V ,
V = I−1EC +△V, IEC = E
[
IC(Θ)
∣∣∣∣F]
∣∣∣∣∣
Θ=Θˆ
(10)
where IEC is the expectation of complete-data information matrix IC(Θ) over the conditional distributions
evaluated at Θˆ, which can be calculated in the standard EM method. The variance inflation part ∆V
in (10) can be written as a function of DM as follows:
△V = I−1EC ·DM(I −DM)
−1, (11)
where I is simply the identity matrix and DM is the matrix rate of EM convergence, whose calculation
is shown in detail in Meng and Rubin (1991). Hence, the standard errors of the estimators are the square
roots of the diagonal elements of V .
4.4. Simulation
We perform a simulation study in this part to validate our MF-RSD model and the estimation method.
We provide an example in which the regime-switching probabilities are driven by a one-dimensional
factor x, which is piecewise constant and takes alternative values among {0.4,−0.3, 0.6,−0.5}, as shown
in Figure 5. Hence, the regime switching probabilities are determined as following:
log
Pjl,i
1− Pjl,i
= βjl,0 + βjl,1 · xi−1,
where 1 ≤ j 6= l ≤ 2. The model parameters µk, λk,βjl (k = 1, 2) are shown in Table 1. These values are
chosen so that moderate regime-switching probabilities are generated from the model. We then simulate
yi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) for n = 9000 and show the results in Figure 5. Note that the simulated yi exhibits a
large variation and that the histogram in the bottom left panel shows a clear bimodal distribution, which
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demonstrates that our model can indeed generate bimodality. We then use the EM algorithm to estimate
the model and show the estimated values in Table 1, from which we can see that the estimates are quite
close to the true values with low standard errors, and the confidence intervals of estimates basically cover
the true values. We also show the simulated and estimated states si (1 ≤ i ≤ 1000) in the bottom right
panel of Figure 5, from which we find that the difference between the true and estimated states are quite
small, and the underlying states capture the clustering of long (or short) inter-trade durations.
Table 1: True and estimated parameters with piecewise constant xi.
µ1 λ1 µ2 λ2 β12,0 β12,1 β21,0 β21,1
True values 0.3 0.01 5 2 -5 -7 -2.6 6
Estimated values
0.308 0.0098 4.831 1.984 -5.022 -7.384 -2.538 5.696
(0.0242) (0.000187) (0.129) (0.0491) (0.388) (0.996) (0.137) (0.317)
Note: standard errors are shown in parentheses.
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Figure 5: Top left: {xi} (1 ≤ i ≤ 1000); Top right: Simulated {yi}. Bottom left: Histogram of the common logarithm of
simulated durations; Bottom right: Comparison of the estimated states and simulated states for the first 1000 points of
simulated durations. The estimated states and real states are scaled differently to see them clearly.
5. Real data analysis
5.1. Data cleaning and descriptive statistics
In the following, we implement the real data analysis for the inter-trade durations in the NASDAQ
limit order market. The inter-trade durations usually contain the intra-day calendar effect, i.e., inter-
trade durations tend to be shorter early and late in the day and longer around noon. Based on the
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of inter-trade durations for 25 NASDAQ stocks in January 2013.
Stock Count Min 25% Med. 75% Max Mean Std. Skew. Kurt. O.D.
AAPL 539369 4.94E-06 7.51E-04 0.03 0.86 83.23 1.04 2.55 5.32 47.70 2.46
ALXN 88916 5.28E-06 1.09E-03 0.19 6.05 286.81 6.23 14.03 4.71 35.76 2.25
AMZN 171344 5.32E-06 5.03E-04 0.01 2.12 254.97 3.27 8.53 5.44 50.79 2.61
BIDU 102830 5.66E-06 9.97E-04 0.14 5.28 242.40 5.48 12.49 4.77 36.05 2.28
BMRN 47012 5.57E-06 6.56E-04 0.49 12.66 437.95 12.06 25.07 3.83 22.49 2.08
CELG 138826 5.00E-06 1.05E-03 0.11 4.18 213.83 4.06 8.66 4.13 28.22 2.13
CERN 44963 3.84E-06 1.05E-03 0.19 12.46 706.02 12.87 28.38 4.55 38.78 2.21
CMCSA 107143 5.93E-06 1.62E-03 0.16 4.64 601.18 5.29 12.88 6.42 101.10 2.43
COST 79533 6.51E-06 1.87E-03 0.44 7.73 444.95 6.81 13.88 4.84 56.97 2.04
DISCA 55283 5.72E-06 2.92E-03 0.82 11.16 425.82 10.06 20.41 4.09 28.31 2.03
EBAY 169875 6.39E-06 3.00E-03 0.21 3.52 363.80 3.47 7.61 5.44 76.51 2.20
FB 151244 4.34E-06 8.69E-04 0.08 3.20 294.02 3.92 9.88 5.80 59.27 2.52
GOOG 135745 5.50E-06 7.07E-04 0.06 3.75 235.97 4.05 9.16 4.34 29.78 2.26
INTC 124260 5.16E-06 1.00E-03 0.04 3.20 361.41 4.63 12.23 5.89 60.05 2.64
ISRG 38118 4.90E-06 4.43E-04 0.04 11.90 1504.86 15.02 37.79 6.45 102.77 2.52
KLAC 70264 5.17E-06 3.06E-03 0.54 9.21 600.68 8.31 17.46 5.68 83.42 2.10
MAR 39728 5.29E-06 3.03E-03 1.22 15.60 2166.25 14.02 31.83 15.83 795.34 2.27
MSFT 163839 5.91E-06 1.20E-03 0.05 2.50 833.87 3.72 10.69 10.40 348.43 2.87
NFLX 182071 5.05E-06 5.58E-04 0.03 2.41 242.51 3.34 8.47 5.17 43.02 2.54
QCOM 161471 6.86E-06 2.97E-03 0.26 3.75 443.04 3.54 7.71 6.08 115.19 2.18
REGN 52770 4.68E-06 4.76E-04 0.05 8.71 632.70 10.57 25.64 5.30 50.58 2.43
SBUX 101250 5.47E-06 3.52E-03 0.57 6.47 201.61 5.51 10.78 3.95 25.89 1.96
TXN 97907 5.28E-06 1.72E-03 0.27 5.73 461.87 5.87 13.20 5.04 49.99 2.25
VOD 57699 5.81E-06 3.86E-03 0.78 10.14 794.09 10.81 25.51 6.40 87.76 2.36
YHOO 91951 5.24E-06 1.63E-03 0.24 5.92 460.85 6.31 14.89 5.37 51.83 2.36
Note: 25%, Med., and 75% are the 25th percentile, 50th percentile (median), and 75th percentile, respectively. Std., Skew.,
and Kurt. are the standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis, respectively.
standard dummy variable procedure (e.g.,Ghysels et al. (2004)), we find that that the intra-day calendar
effect is a common phenomena for all stocks in our sample (shown in Section E in the Appendices.).
Therefore, prior to the analysis, we have adjusted inter-trade durations for the calendar effects.
For each stock in our sample, we aggregate the inter-trade durations in January 2013 and provide
the descriptive statistics in Table 2. These statistics include count, min (the minimum), three quantiles,
max (the maximum), mean, standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, and over-dispersion (O.D.), which is
the standard deviation divided by the mean. Table 2 suggests the following: 1) There is a large variation
in their counts and maximum values; 2) The minimum values are approximately 10−6 seconds, and the
mean values are approximately 1-10 seconds; 3) Their median value has a small variation, with most of
them are around or below 0.1 seconds; and 4) They all exhibit a large dispersion as the values of their
over-dispersion are significantly greater than one.
5.2. Choice of LOB factors
To identify the factors that may impact the regime switchings of inter-trade durations, we focus the
covariates in our model on the LOB factors for the following reasons. First, many studies advocate that
the order flows are determined by the state of the order book (Hautsch and Huang, 2012; Huang et al.,
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2015; Abergel and Jedidi, 2015); therefore, factors reflecting the state of the LOB are thought to de-
termine the flow of market orders and hence the inter-trade durations. Second, the information flow
revealed by the change of LOB contribute a major part of information learning for the market partic-
ipants (Harris and Panchapagesan, 2005; Cao et al., 2009), especially for the HFTs who take the speed
advantage to trade on the information. Third, a lot of research has found that the algorithm traders in
the limit order market are indeed using LOB factors as signals to set their trading strategies. (Li et al.,
2005; Obizhaeva and Wang, 2013; Hendershott and Riordan, 2013; Goldstein et al., 2018), so these fac-
tors must play an important role on the arrival time of trades, i.e., the inter-trade durations.
Let pa and pb be the prices (dollar prices divided by 10) for the best ask and the best bid, respectively,
and v1a and v
1
b be the depth at the best ask and the best bid, respectively. We consider the following
four LOB factors as the covariates in our MF-RSD model.
• Depth imbalance (DI). DI =
|v1
a
−v1
b
|
|v1
a
+v1
b
|
. It is the difference between the depth of the best ask and the
depth of the best bid, divided by the sum of the two depths. It compares order supplies between
the best ask and the best bid, and a large DI reflects a great imbalance of the two sides in offering
liquidity. Some studies (Cont et al., 2014; Lipton et al., 2013; Cartea et al., 2018) suggest that it
is an effective predictor for the subsequent price movements and the rate of incoming orders.
• Price spread (PS). PS = |pa − pb|, which is the price difference between the best ask and the
best bid. It is commonly considered as a result of information asymmetry and reveals the stock’s
overall liquidity (O’Hara, 2003). From the perspective of market microstructure, it measures the
transaction cost for the liquidity demander, and normally, a wider price spread implies weaker
trading aggressiveness (Ranaldo, 2004). Moreover, Carrion (2013) and Hendershott and Riordan
(2013) found that high-frequency market makers provide liquidity when the spread is large while
they take liquidity when the spread is small.
• Trade volume of the last trade, denoted by TV. It is the size of the last trade (volume mea-
sured in thousands), which is generally treated as a momentum variable that reflects the trading
magnitude and willingness. Large trades normally convey more information than small trades
(Hasbrouck, 1991) and are also expected to be accompanied by some small upcoming trades
(Van Kervel and Menkveld, 2019).
• Price movement of the last trade, denoted by PM. It is a dummy variable that indicates whether the
last trade had led to a change in mid-price, i.e.,
p
a
+pb
2 . We think it might be a momentum variable
for the price change and we want to see whether market participants treat it as an informative
signal to identify the price movement in the following moments.
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Table 3: Summary statistics for 4 LOB factors, which are depth imbalance (DI), price spread (PS), trade volume of the
last trade (TV ), and price movement of the last trade (PM).
Stock
DI PS TV PM
25% Med 75% 25% Med 75% 25% Med 75% Mean
AAPL 0.22 0.50 0.78 0.8 1.2 1.7 0.04 0.1 0.12 0.34
ALXN 0.16 0.37 0.71 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.05 0.1 0.1 0.38
AMZN 0.20 0.48 0.77 0.8 1.2 1.7 0.03 0.1 0.1 0.42
BIDU 0.20 0.39 0.71 0.3 0.4 0.7 0.09 0.1 0.15 0.43
BMRN 0.14 0.33 0.58 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.40
CELG 0.18 0.39 0.69 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.05 0.1 0.1 0.40
CERN 0.20 0.43 0.75 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.03 0.1 0.1 0.38
CMCSA 0.22 0.45 0.70 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.08
COST 0.20 0.40 0.66 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.05 0.1 0.12 0.36
DISCA 0.20 0.39 0.67 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.08 0.1 0.11 0.36
EBAY 0.23 0.48 0.72 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.17 0.34 0.18
FB 0.24 0.48 0.74 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.7 0.08
GOOG 0.19 0.49 0.79 1.7 2.6 3.7 0.02 0.09 0.1 0.40
INTC 0.22 0.46 0.74 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 1.2 0.03
ISRG 0.20 0.58 0.94 3.5 4.9 6.3 0.006 0.05 0.1 0.41
KLAC 0.20 0.42 0.66 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.30
MAR 0.20 0.41 0.64 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.29
MSFT 0.24 0.49 0.77 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.32 1.12 0.03
NFLX 0.14 0.38 0.68 0.9 1.4 2 0.07 0.1 0.11 0.45
QCOM 0.23 0.46 0.70 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.15
REGN 0.05 0.33 0.67 1.4 2 2.9 0.04 0.1 0.1 0.45
SBUX 0.21 0.44 0.68 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.26 0.22
TXN 0.24 0.50 0.74 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.11
VOD 0.31 0.60 0.84 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.28 0.7 0.09
YHOO 0.26 0.51 0.75 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.9 0.05
Note: 25%, Med., and 75% are the 25th percentile, 50th percentile (median), and 75th percentile, respectively.
In Table 3, we show some summary statistics of these LOB factors. The minimum and maximum
values of DI are 0 and 1, and the minimum values of PS and TV are always 0.1 (1 cent) and 0.001
(1 share), respectively; we do not report these values in the table. Since the factor PM is a dummy
variable, we only report its mean, or equivalently the ratio of the times when it equals to 1. From Table
3, we find that the percentiles of DI are very similar across stocks. The factors TV and PM do have
some differences from stock to stock, while the most divergent factor is PS. For some stocks, such as
CMCSA, FB, INTC, MSFT, TXN, VOD and YHOO, the factor PS are most time fixed at 0.1 (the
minimum tick size). But for some other stocks, such as GOOG, ISRG, and REGN, PS varies much and
its values can be very large.
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5.3. In-sample regression and model prediction
We first implement the in-sample analysis for the inter-trade durations of MSFT on January 2, 2013,
according to the following regression models for the transition probabilities:
log
P12
1− P12
= β12,0 + β12,1DI + β12,2PS + β12,3TV + β12,4PM,
log
P21
1− P21
= β21,0 + β21,1DI + β21,3PS + β21,4TV + β21,5PM.
(12)
The model is estimated using the EM procedure as described in Section 4 and the results are reported
in Table 4. In addition to the full model - Model 6, we also estimate the submodels (Models 1-5). The
distribution parameters estimated from the full model are very close to those from the submodels, and
the estimated factor coefficients in the full model are having similar signs and significance levels as those
in the submodels, suggesting that there is no strong multicollinearity in the LOB factors. In the rest of
the empirical study, we shall only report the results using the full model (M6).
Table 4: Estimation results for MSFT on January 2, 2013, in 6 regression models.
Parameters M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
µˆ1 0.131
(.0632)*
0.125
(.0602)*
0.132
(.0637)*
0.145
(.0690)*
0.131
(.0632)*
0.142
(.0670)**
λˆ1 0.000234
(5.45e-6)**
0.000234
(5.45e-6)**
0.000234
(5.45e-6)**
0.000234
(5.44e-6)**
0.000234
(5.45e-6**
0.000234
(5.44e-6)**
µˆ2 10.066
(.418)**
10.070
(.419)**
10.062
(.418)**
10.025
(.423)**
10.065
(.418)**
10.024
(.422)**
λˆ2 2.411
(.109)**
2.407
(.109)**
2.403
(.109)**
2.324
(.106)**
2.409
(.109)**
2.318
(.105)**
βˆ12,0 -1.061
(.0393)**
-0.424
(.0723)**
-0.781
(.120)**
-0.991
(.0459)**
-1.064
(.0407)**
0.881
(.177)**
βˆ12,1 _ -1.249
(.128)**
_ _ _ -1.654
(.138)
βˆ12,2 _ _ -2.237
(.913)*
_ _ -8.145
(1.118)**
βˆ12,3 _ _ _ -0.0944
(.0368)*
_ -0.107
(.0350)**
βˆ12,4 _ _ _ _ 0.0479
(.156)
0.157
(.179)
βˆ21,0 -0.442
(.0433)**
-0.925
(.0915)**
0.345
(.328)
-0.886
(.0569)**
-0.443
(.0432)**
-1.018
(.417)*
βˆ21,1 _ 0.947
(.158)**
_ _ _ 1.139
(.168)**
βˆ21,2 _ _ -7.685
(3.187)*
_ _ -4.539
(3.831)
βˆ21,3 _ _ _ 0.342
(.0320)**
_ 0.341
(.0305)**
βˆ21,4 _ _ _ _ 0.345
(.692)
1.445
(.810)
Notes: M1 is a model without any LOB factor. M2-M5 are models having 1 LOB factor, with DI, PS, TV and PM , respectively.
M6 is a model with all 4 LOB factors. The robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ∗p < 0.05 and ∗ ∗ p < 0.01.
From Table 4, we can see that the estimated mean of the long-duration regime is much larger than
19
that of the short-duration regimes, i.e., µˆ2 >> µˆ1. Based on the estimated values for the parameters of
two IVGs, we also calculate the modes of the two distributions. They are around 8×10−5 seconds and 1
second, which are consistent with the bimodal distribution of inter-trade durations discussed in Section
3. Moreover, we have noticed the following results for the LOB factors. First, the estimated coefficients
for the DI is significantly positive for P12 (βˆ12,1 > 0) and significantly negative for P21 (βˆ21,1 < 0).
Second, the PS is shown to be both negative for P12 and P21 while its coefficient is only significant in
P12. Third, βˆ12,3 is significantly less than 0 and βˆ21,3 is significantly greater than 0, suggesting that
the TV is a significant factor for the regime switchings of inter-trade durations. Last, the factor PM
seems to be insignificant in this case because both βˆ12,4 and βˆ21,4 are not significantly different than 0.
Nonetheless, the LOB factors fairly impact the dynamics of inter-trade duration via regime-switching
probabilities, and we expect that our MF-RSD model can enhance the prediction of inter-trade durations
by considering their effects. Moreover, we’d like to understand more about the economics implication of
the effects of LOB factors on the regime switchings of inter-trade durations, which will be discussed in
detail in Section 5.5.
Given the estimated values of model parameters, we examine the model prediction power by first con-
sidering a 1-step-ahead out-of-sample prediction for the underlying states. The 1-step-ahead prediction
of si is given by
Ei(si+1) = 1 ·
[
P(si = 1|F)Pˆ11,i+1 + P(si = 2|F)Pˆ21,i+1
]
+ 2 ·
[
P(si = 1|F)Pˆ12,i+1 + P(si = 2|F)Pˆ22,i+1
]
,
(13)
and the transition probabilities at i are given by
log
Pˆ12,i+1
1− P12,i+1
= βˆ12,0 + βˆ12,1DIi + βˆ12,2PSi + βˆ12,3TVi + βˆ12,4PMi
log
Pˆ21,i+1
1− P21,i+1
= βˆ21,0 + βˆ21,1DIi + βˆ21,2PSi + βˆ21,3TVi + βˆ21,4PMi.
(14)
which can be calculated given the information up to i−th trade.
We use the MSFT inter-trade duration series on January 2, 2013, to demonstrate the above prediction.
The model parameter is estimated using the first 5000 samples, and 1-step-ahead forecasting is made
for the next 200 durations. Figure 6 shows the comparison between the estimated states and the 1-
step-ahead forecasts. The estimated states are the underlying states inferred from the real data, and
the forecasted states are 1-step-ahead out-of-sample prediction.8 From the result, we can see that the
forecasted states almost capture the variation tendency of the underlying estimated states.
8The states jump between two values, i.e., state 1 (the short-duration regime) and state 2 (the long-duration regime)
20
0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200
Sequence
1
2
St
at
es
Estimated States
Forecasted States
Figure 6: 1-step-ahead out-of-sample forecasted versus estimated regime states.
Furthermore, the 1-step-ahead prediction for the inter-trade duration is expressed as
En(yn+1) = µˆ1 ·
[
P(sn = 1|F)Pˆ11,n+1 + P(sn = 2|F)Pˆ21,n+1
]
+ µˆ2 ·
[
P(sn = 1|F)Pˆ12,n+1 + P(sn = 2|F)Pˆ22,n+1
]
.
(15)
To see the predictive performance of our model, we compare our results in predicting the next inter-trade
duration with those of two classical duration models, i.e., the ACD model by Engle and Russell (1998)
and the MSMD model by Chen et al. (2013). The ACD model we considered has the following form:
yi = ϕiεi, ϕi = ω + αyi−1 + βϕi−1,
where εi follows an inverse Gaussian distribution. The MSMD model we considered has five levels, and
the following form:
yi =
εi
λi
= ϕiεi, ϕi = ϕ
5∏
k=1
Mk,i,
Mk,i =

M w.p. 1− (1− γ5)
bk−5
Mk,i−1 w.p. (1− γ5)
bk−5
k = 1 . . . 5, M =

m0 w.p. 1/2
1−m0 w.p. 1/2
in which εi also follows an inverse Gaussian distribution.
Table 5 shows the comparison among our model, the ACD(1,1) model and the MSMD(5) model.
We use the BIC as an indicator to compare their in-sample fitness. From the results, we find that the
in-sample fitness of our MF-RSD model is slightly worse than that of the ACD(1,1) model but better
21
than that of the MSMD(5) model. This is probably because the ACD model has the most parsimonious
structure and the least number of parameters. For the out-of-sample prediction power, we use the RMSE
between the real duration and the predicted duration as a measurement. Nonetheless, from the results
in Table 5, our MF-RSD model performs significantly better than the other two models.
Table 5: The evaluation of in-sample fitness and out-of-sample forecast for 25 NASDAQ stocks on January 2, 2013, with
a benchmark comparison to the ACD and MSMD models.
Log-likelihood BIC RMSE
Stock n MF-RSD ACD MSMD MF-RSD ACD MSMD MF-RSD ACD MSMD
AAPL 28888 35421.60 35936.97 30748.48 -70699.41 -71812.31 -61445.60 1.91 2.00 2.91
ALXN 5240 -704.66 -318.01 -1365.19 1529.22 687.40 2773.20 8.21 9.38 9.54
AMZN 7674 5901.71 5876.18 5024.88 -11678.18 -11698.69 -10005.03 6.95 7.14 8.37
BIDU 3819 -4467.04 -4130.39 -4685.14 9049.55 8310.27 9411.52 12.09 13.39 18.05
BMRN 2892 -2729.22 -2435.24 -3127.84 5570.02 4918.29 6295.53 15.75 18.96 21.25
CELG 4717 -3832.10 -3420.28 -3498.79 7782.63 6891.31 7039.87 8.54 9.72 9.81
CERN 2460 -2424.12 -2202.68 -1316.67 4957.55 4452.21 2672.38 15.50 19.07 29.18
CMCSA 5235 -2031.46 -1933.45 -1778.63 4182.80 3918.28 3600.08 11.11 12.56 12.61
COST 4330 -4394.69 -4125.27 -4907.93 8906.61 8300.78 9857.73 8.96 10.22 10.67
DISCA 3055 -1062.11 -891.86 -919.68 2236.57 1831.87 1879.49 16.66 16.92 17.96
EBAY 9697 1450.65 2098.67 -484.82 -2772.79 -4142.26 1015.53 5.78 5.59 6.04
FB 10278 8222.19 8579.60 5865.68 -16315.06 -17103.77 -11685.17 5.13 5.46 7.06
GOOG 6387 4725.22 4715.50 -6186.30 -9327.78 -9378.43 12416.41 8.13 8.44 8.59
INTC 5300 2149.62 2144.01 10.61 -4179.19 -4236.57 21.66 11.27 12.20 12.11
ISRG 1918 -1128.08 -1028.33 -715.34 2361.99 2094.46 1468.48 25.72 27.33 30.48
KLAC 3059 -3076.43 -2749.82 -2536.58 6265.23 5547.80 5113.29 14.32 16.17 26.80
MAR 2404 -3733.69 -3430.79 -3801.85 7576.38 6908.28 7642.62 21.91 22.42 26.41
MSFT 6242 3472.11 3354.70 2887.86 -6821.88 -6656.96 -5732.03 8.19 9.57 9.91
NFLX 3594 -2158.32 -1800.04 -4272.06 4431.27 3649.20 8585.06 10.98 12.89 13.33
QCOM 8726 -2759.03 -2061.64 -6911.35 5645.10 4177.72 13868.07 5.35 5.85 6.04
REGN 3841 860.04 999.03 808.91 -1604.53 -1948.53 -1576.55 10.89 12.56 12.88
SBUX 5740 -3886.73 -3290.91 -4722.18 7894.64 6633.76 9487.64 7.10 7.76 8.64
TXN 5633 -1794.99 -1412.53 -3939.81 3710.88 2876.88 7922.80 9.38 11.01 11.07
VOD 1810 -2257.49 -2259.32 -2312.70 4619.99 4563.65 4662.91 42.13 44.50 45.61
YHOO 3797 1223.24 1195.00 -611.21 -2331.08 -4109.70 1263.63 16.69 15.74 16.48
Note: BIC=k ∗ lnn − 2 ∗ ln Lˆ, where Lˆ is the likelihood. The lower value BIC is, the better the in-sample fitness. The
RMSE is the square root of MSE, and the lower the value is, the better the out-of-sample performance.
5.4. Analysis of regimes
In the next, we want to see the characteristics of the underlying regimes that are estimated from
our MF-RSD model. In Figure 7, we plot the first MSFT 300 inter-trade durations on January 2, 2013,
along with their estimated levels of the underlying regimes. It shows that the estimated regimes capture
the clustering of the long (or short) inter-trade durations, and there are significant switchings between
the long-duration regime and the short-duration regime. Given the estimated underlying regimes, we
will diagnose the two regimes and check whether they are related to different channels of profitability for
the HFTs, because we think that in the long-duration regime, HFTs mainly provide liquidity and gain
profit from the price spread as market makers, while in the short-duration regime, HFTs aggressively
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take liquidity and earn profit as speculators because of the short-term price movement.
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Figure 7: Estimated regime levels for the first 300 MSFT inter-trade durations on January 2, 2013. The estimated regime
level is the mean of the estimated underlying regimes.
To make things comparable, we divide the trading day into 360 one-minute intervals and calculate
the ratio of the number of short inter-trade durations to the total number of trades in each interval,
which is defined as the HF ratio. We categorize the short and long inter-trade durations based on which
regime they belong to. The LF ratio is then defined as the ratio of long inter-trade durations and hence
equals to 1-HF ratio. Thus, a high HF (LF) ratio means that the short-duration (long-duration) regime
is dominated in the interval. Following Carrion (2013), we use the permanent price change and the
realized price spread as the metrics of profit. The permanent price change is defined as the absolute
percentage change of midpoint price in the one-minute interval, which measures the profit of taking
liquidity, and the realized price spread is the average effective price spread minus the permanent price
change, which measures the profit of supplying liquidity. We also include the order submission rate and
the cancellation rate to see the market activity level. As the time length of the interval is fixed, we
simply use the numbers of submissions and cancellations in one minute to represent the rates.
We still use MSFT on January 2, 2013 as an example. For each one-minute interval, we calculate the
HF ratio, the LF ratio, the order submissions, the order cancellations, the permanent price change, and
the realized price spread. In Table 6, we present their correlation matrix, from which we can observe that
the HF ratio is positively correlated with the order submissions, cancellations, and the permanent price
change, but negatively correlated with the realized price spread. The LF ratio is having the opposite
relationships with those 4 metrics. Thus, the profit of taking liquidity is large when the market in the
short-duration regime in which the HFTs are using aggressive trading strategies. While in the period
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with a high LF ratio, i.e., when HFTs mainly supply liquidity, the profit of supplying liquidity is larger
as the realized price spread is positively correlated with the LF ratio.
Table 6: Pearson correlation matrix for the HF ratio, the LF ratio, the order submissions, cancellations, the permanent
price change and the realized price spread.
HF ratio LF ratio Cancel Submit Price Realized
change spread
HF ratio 1
LF ratio -1 1
Cancel 0.472** -0.472** 1
Submit 0.474** -0.474** 0.998** 1
Price change 0.366** -0.366** 0.457** 0.463** 1
Realized spread -0.298** 0.298** -0.330** -0.337** -0.982** 1
*p<0.05, **p<0.01
Furthermore, we implement the below regression to see which regime or which regime-switching action
is followed by a significant short-term price movement.
∆Pi,t(+10s) = constant+ 1si=1 + Pˆ12,i+1 + Pˆ21,i+1 + εit (16)
In the regression, ∆Pi,t(+10s) is the absolute value of the percentage change of midpoint price in the next
10 seconds after i−th trade.9 1si=1 is the indicator which equals to 1 if the i−th trade belongs to the
short-duration regime. Pˆ12,i+1 is the estimated transition probability for the next inter-trade duration
switching from the short-duration regime to the long-duration regime, and Pˆ21,i+1 is the estimated regime
transition probability for the next inter-trade duration on the contrary; both of them are calculated by
equation (14) according to our MF-RSD model.
Table 7: The regressions of the short-term price change on the short-duration regime and regime-switching probabilities
∆P ∆P ∆P ∆P
1si=1 .0032 .0037
(.001)* (.001)**
Pˆ12,i+1 -.0131 .0027
(.005)* (.006)
Pˆ21,i+1 .0124 .0146
(.003)** (.004)**
constant .0377 .0431 .0350 .0312
(.001)** (.001)** (.001)** (.003)**
Note: ∆P is the percentage change of mid-price in the next 10 seconds. The robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
∗p < 0.05 and ∗ ∗ p < 0.01.
The regression results are presented in Table 7. From it, we can see that the coefficient for 1si=1
is positive. Hence the short-duration regime will be followed by a larger price change compared with
the long-duration regime. Nonetheless, from the last column of Table 7, we note that the effect for the
9As we mainly care about the HFTs’ behaviors, we think 10 seconds is long enough at the high-frequency level.
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transition probability from the long-duration regime to the short-duration regime is even stronger, as
the coefficient of Pˆ21,i+1 is significantly greater than the coefficient of 1si=1. This means that a large
price change follows the short-duration regime, while a stronger price movement will occur subsequently
if the market is switching from the long-duration regime to the short-duration regime. We think this
switching could be predicted by the HFTs, so they would take this opportunity to trade on the signal
and to earn a profit as price speculators. However, the effect for Pˆ12,i+1 is not significant, so the price
change is relatively small if the HFTs turn from the aggressive trading strategy to the passive one.
5.5. Analysis of LOB factors
At last, we have studied the informativeness of LOB factors to the trading activities by applying the
MF-RSD model to the 25 NASDAQ stocks in our sample for 21 trading days (January 2013). For each
stock and each factor, we count the number of days in which the factor coefficient in the regression (12)
is significant. The results are presented in Table 8 and the main findings are as follows.
Table 8: Summary of the results for the significance of 4 LOB factors in the MF-RSD model.
Stock
DI PS TV PM
P12 P21 P12 P21 P12 P21 P12 P21
sig(+) sig(-) sig(+) sig(-) sig(+) sig(-) sig(+) sig(-) sig(+) sig(-) sig(+) sig(-) sig(+) sig(-) sig(+) sig(-)
AAPL 0 13 1 2 21 0 0 21 0 11 21 0 21 0 9 0
ALXN 3 1 1 4 7 0 0 19 0 10 9 1 20 0 0 21
AMZN 1 2 4 0 17 0 0 21 0 9 15 0 21 0 0 21
BIDU 1 0 1 0 13 0 0 19 0 4 16 0 21 0 0 21
BMRN 0 0 3 0 9 1 0 21 0 6 11 0 15 0 0 12
CELG 0 3 6 0 4 2 0 14 0 13 20 0 21 0 0 21
CERN 1 0 1 1 7 0 0 18 0 4 9 0 21 0 0 20
CMCSA 0 17 19 0 1 12 0 7 0 16 21 0 11 0 6 0
COST 3 2 1 0 4 4 0 15 0 12 20 0 21 0 0 21
DISCA 0 2 1 0 2 1 0 17 0 8 17 0 19 0 0 19
EBAY 1 3 0 6 10 0 0 21 0 18 20 0 20 0 0 3
FB 0 12 2 2 14 3 0 21 0 16 21 0 20 0 9 0
GOOG 1 4 2 1 21 0 0 21 0 12 20 0 21 0 0 18
INTC 0 20 18 0 0 15 1 3 0 14 20 0 2 5 5 0
ISRG 1 1 0 2 10 3 0 20 5 0 11 0 18 0 1 12
KLAC 0 6 2 1 5 3 0 17 0 11 15 0 12 0 0 11
MAR 0 10 4 0 1 4 0 11 0 9 16 0 10 0 2 4
MSFT 0 20 20 0 1 17 1 2 0 13 20 0 1 6 5 0
NFLX 0 6 7 0 13 1 0 21 0 12 19 0 21 0 0 18
QCOM 0 11 4 0 5 1 0 21 0 20 21 0 15 0 4 6
REGN 0 12 9 0 17 1 0 21 1 0 9 0 21 0 0 19
SBUX 0 14 4 0 2 5 0 15 0 17 21 0 11 0 0 3
TXN 0 13 8 0 1 3 0 8 0 11 21 0 9 0 2 1
VOD 0 15 17 0 3 2 0 0 1 1 19 0 9 0 1 0
YHOO 0 21 19 0 1 9 3 2 0 12 21 0 2 5 6 0
Sum (%) 2.3% 39.6% 29.3% 3.6% 36.0% 16.6% 1.0% 71.6% 1.3% 49.3% 82.5% 0.2% 73.0% 3.0% 9.5% 47.8%
Note: P12 represents the regime switching from the short-duration regime to the long-duration regime, and P21 represents the
regime switching from the long-duration regime to the short-duration regime. Significance is measured at the 5% level. Sig(+)/Sig(-
) means that the estimated coefficient for the factor is significantly positive/negative. Each cell shows the counts of significance.
We have 21 trading days for each stock, so the upper limit for each cell is 21. The last row records the percentage (%) of the times
that this factor appears as significant in all 525 instances (25 stocks times 21 days).
1. The effect of DI: in approximately 40% of total instances, it is significantly negative for P12,
and in approximately 30% of total instances, it is significantly positive for P21. Hence, the effect
of depth imbalance between the best ask and the best bid on the regime-switching probabilities
is not very common. Nevertheless, for the stocks which have very tight price spread, DI has a
common effect. For instance, we have summarized the results for the stocks whose price spread
mostly keep at 0.1, including CMCSA, FB, INTC, MSFT, TXN, VOD, and YHOO, and find that
DI is significantly negative for P12 in 80% of total occurrences and significant positive for P21 in
70% of total occurrences. Thus, we think that the impact of DI on the dynamics of inter-trade
durations is price spread dependent. When price spread is tight, the effect of DI is significant, i.e.,
the greater the depth imbalance is, the inter-trade durations are more likely to stay in (or switch
to) the short-duration regime.
2. The effect of PS: it is not obvious for P12, but it is significantly negative for P21 in more than
70% of total instances. Thus, the effect of the price spread between the best ask and the best bid
on the inter-trade durations switching from the short-duration regime to the long-duration regime
is ambiguous, while it is commonly significantly negative for the switching from the long-duration
regime to the short-duration regime. This means that the larger the price spread is, it is more
likely that the inter-trade durations that were previously in the long-duration regime keep staying
in the long-duration regime.
3. The effect of TV : it is significantly negative for P12 in nearly 50% of total instances and is signifi-
cantly positive for P21 in 82% of total instances. Thus, the larger quantity the last trade has, the
more likely that the short inter-trade durations stay in the preceding short-duration regime. Also,
a larger quantity of trade is more likely to lead the inter-trade durations that were previously in
the long-duration regime to switch to the short-duration regime.
4. The effect of PM : it is significantly positive for P12 in 73% of total instances and is significantly
negative for P21 in nearly 50% of total instances. Hence, whether the mid-price has changed in
the previous trade has an important effect on the regime-switching probabilities. It is commonly
significantly positive for the inter-trade durations switching from the short-duration regime to the
long-duration regime, which means that if mid-price has moved, inter-trade durations are very
likely to switch to the long-duration regime. Also in many cases, it is significantly negative for the
inter-trade durations switching from the long-duration regime to the short-duration regime, which
means that if the mid-price moves, inter-trade durations are inclined to stay in the preceding
long-duration regime.
Some of our findings are in harmony with those of the existing research on market microstructure.
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First, many papers (Li et al., 2005; Goldstein et al., 2018; Van Kervel and Menkveld, 2019) suggest that
order imbalance is a good predictor for price movement, and algorithm traders would use it as a trading
indicator. A larger imbalance is a signal for future price movement and hence encourages traders (in
particular HFTs) to actively trade to gain profit (or prevent loss). This is why, in some cases, the
effect of depth imbalance is significantly negative for inter-trade durations switching from the short-
duration regime to the long-duration regime and significantly positive for the switching from the long-
duration regime to the short-duration regime. Second, according to (Ranaldo, 2004; Carrion, 2013;
Hendershott and Riordan, 2013), price spread is an indicator of liquidity and measures the profit (cost)
of providing (taking) liquidity. A large price spread indicates illiquidity of the asset, and the larger the
price spread is, the more transaction cost liquidity takers face and meanwhile the more profit liquidity
providers have. Thus, when the price spread becomes larger, people are more reluctant to initialize
market orders and the inter-trade durations are more likely to be long. Third, trade volume is indeed
a momentum variable that reflects trading willingness (O’hara, 1995; Hasbrouck, 1991). A large trade
volume would not only keep the market in an active trading period (the short-duration regime) but
also lead the market to switch from a passive trading period to an active one. Finally, the effect of
price movement seems to violate the negative correlation between price movement and duration length
(Manganelli, 2005; Furfine, 2007). However, in our high-frequency data, perhaps the change in mid-price
in the last trade is not a momentum variable for future price movement. Moreover, we find that the
change in mid-price just occurs because the existing limit orders at best bid or best ask are eliminated by
the incoming trade, and consequently the price spread between the best ask and the best bid increases.
Thus, we suspect that its effect on the regime switchings of inter-trade durations is probably resulted
from another channel, i.e., an increase in the price spread.
In addition, we obtain some new findings. First, the depth imbalance plays an important role mostly
when the price spread is small. A possible explanation is that when the price spread is large, the
depth imbalance is less informative as it is relatively costless for traders to submit orders at the best
ask/bid. Moreover, within the revealed price spread, perhaps there are some hidden limit orders that
make the true depth imbalance between the best ask and the best bid unknowable. Only when the price
spread is tight, the depth imbalance reveals more information and becomes a valid indicator for the
subsequent price movement. Next, a large price spread is more likely to keep inter-trade durations in
the long-duration regime rather than to reverse inter-trade durations from the short-duration regime to
the long-duration regime, as we have observed that the effect of price spread is commonly negative for
P21 but is not obvious for P12. This finding suggests that traders are more sensitive to the size of PS
when the market is in the long-duration regime, in which HFTs mainly provide liquidity and slow traders
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consume liquidity. The slow traders seem to be more concerned with a high transaction cost induced by
a large PS when the market is relatively stable. However, when the market enters the short-duration
regime in which HFTs aggressively take liquidity and earn a profit because of the price movement, a large
price spread would not impede the HFTs’ trading aggressiveness and play a significant role in the arrival
time of trades. Finally, as the effect of PM is commonly positive for P12 and PM = 1 is accompanied
by an increase of price spread, whether the price spread has just increased could be a driving force
that leads inter-trade durations to switch to the long-duration regime. This finding may affirm the
viewpoint in Obizhaeva and Wang (2013) that the optimal strategy for algorithm traders depends more
on the resilience properties of supply/demand such as the change in bid-ask spread, rather than its static
property.
To further verify the mechanism of LOB factors on the dynamics of inter-trade durations and our
explanation, we implement the below ‘naive’ panel data regression to see the relationship between the
LOB factors and the price change in the next 10 seconds. The regression model is like following:
∆Pi,t(+10s) = constant+DIi,t + PSi,t + TVit + PMit + µi + εit (17)
where i and t indicate the i−th stock and the t−th trade respectively, and ∆P is the short-term price
change, the same as in the equation 16. Here we just use the data of 25 stocks on the same day, i.e.,
January 2, 2013. The panel data is unbalanced because different stocks have different numbers of trades.
Table 9: The regressions of the short-term price change on the LOB factors
Full Sample Subsample Subsample
(tight spread) (slack spread)
∆P ∆P ∆P ∆P
DI .00192 .00208 .00672** -.000325
(.00119) (.00113) (.00217) (.000597)
PS .00436**
(.00100)
TV .00188** .00189** .00186** .0140*
(.000199) (.000201) (.000192) (.005034)
PM -.00192 -.000890 .00215* -.00139*
(.000626) (.000481) (.000782) (.000603)
constant .0235** .0268** .02242** .0285**
(.00102) (.000542) (.00112) (.000290)
fixed effect Y Y Y Y
number of stocks 25 25 12 13
observations 146,736 146,736 67,921 78,815
Note: Panel data regression with fixed effect. ∆P is the percentage change of mid-price in the next 10 seconds. The robust
standard errors are shown in parentheses. ∗p < 0.05 and ∗ ∗ p < 0.01.
The regression results are presented in Table 9. As we can see, for the full sample, the LOB factor
DI and PM don’t show a significant effect on the price change. This finding advocates that the depth
imbalance is overall not informative and the price movement of last trade is not a momentum variable
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for the future price movement. Nevertheless, a large TV predicts a large price change because the TV is
significantly positive for the ∆P , which is in line with our finding that a large trade volume will induce
short inter-trade durations as HTFs treat it as a signal for future price movement. The coefficient of
PS is significant and positive for ∆P , however, we think the PS could be endogenously correlated with
the price change as the effective price spread (PS) consists of the permanent price change (∆P ) and
the realized price spread, which compensate liquidity providers costs on two aspects, i.e., the adverse
select cost and the ‘real friction’ (Carrion, 2013). Thus, we exclude PS in the second regression and the
result shows that the other three LOB factors have similar effects. We further divided the 25 stocks into
two subgroups to verify the effect of DI. One subgroup has stocks with relatively tight price spreads,10
the other subgroup has the remaining stocks, whose price spreads are relatively slack. From the last
two columns in Table 9, we can observe that the DI in the first subgroup is significantly positive, while
it is insignificant in the second subgroup. The finding strongly supports the conclusion that the depth
imbalance is informative and a valid indicator for HFTs only when the price spread is small, and a large
depth imbalance in such case is very likely to indicate the following price movement.
Moreover, we have provided robustness tests for the findings on the effects of the LOB factors. The
tests include the analysis of NASDAQ stocks in a different month, the analysis of directional trades,
the analysis of DI conditional on the tightness of PS, the analysis with a substitution of DI by the
aggregated depth imbalance, and the analysis with a substitution of PM by a dummy variable for the
increase in price spread. These robustness test are presented in Section F the Appendices, and the results
are very consistent with our findings.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a multifactor regime-switching duration (MF-RSD) model for the
inter-trade durations in the high-frequency limit order market. The motivation is that we have found
a common bimodal distribution of inter-trade durations for the stocks listed in the NASDAQ market.
The simulation study of MF-RSD model not only validates our estimation method but also shows that
the model can replicate the most empirical facts of inter-trade durations, including the newly found
bimodal distribution. Furthermore, based on the empirical analysis, we find that the underlying regimes
are related to the endogenous liquidity provision and consumption by the HFTs in the market. Using
the factor analysis, the MF-RSD model is also capable to identify the types of market information that
algorithm traders learn from and react to in high frequency, which causes the inter-trade durations
switching between the short-duration and the long-duration regime.
10There are 12 stocks in total. 75% percentile of the PS for each stock is less than or equal to 0.2.
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The contribution of the MF-RSD model in analyzing the high-frequency inter-trade duration data
in the LOB can be summarized in the following three aspects. First, the out-of-sample test shows
that the performance of the MF-RSD model in predicting inter-trade durations is significantly improved
compared with the two benchmark duration models. This is because, through the identified impacts of
the LOB factors and the parsimonious structure of the two regimes, our model is able to predict whether
the arrival time of the next trade is relatively long or short. Second, given the estimated regimes and
the estimated regime-switching probabilities by the MF-RSD model, we find empirical evidence that
the switchings between the short-duration regime and the long-duration regime result from the HFTs’
behavior of changing strategies between providing liquidity and taking liquidity, driven by the different
channels of profitability. Specifically, the short-duration regime is followed by a relatively large price
movement, which corresponds to a high profit of taking liquidity, while the long-duration regime is
positively correlated with the realized price spread, which measures the profit of providing liquidity.
Third, the MF-RSD model is also useful in testing economic hypotheses in the market microstructure
theory, and our results are consistent with some findings in the prevalent literature. They are as follows:
1) order book imbalance is applicable to predict the price movement in the short term, and in some
cases, a larger depth imbalance would lead to a shorter inter-trade duration; 2) a larger price spread
tends to maintain inter-trade duration in the long-duration regime because it reflects higher transaction
costs for liquidity demanders; and 3) a larger trade volume is a good momentum variable that reveals
a strong trading willingness, which normally induces a shorter duration for the next trade. Moreover,
we have some new findings added to the literature. They are: 1) the impact of depth imbalance on the
regime-switching of inter-trade duration is spread-dependent and is significant when the stock’s price
spread is tight; 2) a large price spread is not a reverse signal for inter-trade durations switching from
the short-duration regime to the long-duration regime if they were staying in the short-duration regime;
and 3) whether the price spread has just increased in the last trade is nonetheless a reverse signal for the
regime switching of inter-trade durations, through our analysis of the impact of the mid-price movement.
Our work has made progress in analyzing the high-frequency duration data. Nevertheless, it leaves
a great deal to future research. For example, our LOB data is rich in terms of having records of order
submissions and cancellations, we can further investigate the impact of those activities on the arrival
time of trades. To achieve that, a new econometric model is probably needed. Moreover, some event
studies could be implemented to directly identify the HFTs’ behaviors of switching trading strategies if
we can obtain the data that contain exogenous shocks to the market, which helps to verify our findings
on the regime-switching of inter-trade durations. We can also test whether inter-trade durations in other
high-frequency financial markets have similar properties, in particular, whether the bimodal distribution
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is a general phenomenon, and a theoretical market microstructure model is certainly needed if so.
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Appendix A Description of 25 Nasdaq stocks
Table 10: A brief description of 25 selected NASDAQ stocks. It includes their ticker symbols, company names, industry
sectors, and market capitalization, which are measured in 2013.
Ticker Company name Industry Sector Market Cap.
(billion dollars)
AAPL Apple Inc. Technology 351.75
ALXN Alexion Pharmaceuticals Healthcare 19.77
AMZN Amazon.com, Inc. Consumer Cyclical 116.5
BIDU Baidu, Inc. Technology 30.22
BMRN BioMarin Pharmaceutical, Inc. Healthcare 8.62
CELG Celgene Corporation Healthcare 49.98
CERN Cerner Corporation Technology 18.77
CMCSA Comcast Corporation Communication Services 101.14
COST Costco Wholesale Corporation Consumer Defensive 40.91
DISCA Discovery, Inc. Consumer Cyclical 28.52
EBAY eBay Inc. Consumer Cyclical 28.68
FB Facebook, Inc. Technology 68.53
GOOG Alphabet Inc. Technology 265.76
INTC Intel Corporation Technology 90.35
ISRG Intuitive Surgical Inc. Healthcare 19.99
KLAC KLA-Tencor Corporation Technology 6.01
MAR Marriott International, Inc. Consumer Cyclical 11.86
MSFT Microsoft Corporation Technology 211.95
NFLX Netflix, Inc. Consumer Cyclical 9.98
QCOM Qualcomm, Inc. Technology 97.96
REGN Regeneron Pharmaceuticals Healthcare 20.59
SBUX Starbucks Corporation Communication Services 40.32
TXN Texas Instruments Inc. Technology 33.09
VOD Vodafone Group plc Communication Services 102.48
YHOO Yahoo Corporation Financial Services 25.51
Appendix B Robustness of the bimodal distribution of inter-trade durations
We supplement the robustness check of the bimodal distribution. In Figure 8 we plot the histograms
of the common logarithms of the raw inter-trade durations that haven’t been adjusted for the intra-day
calendar effects. And in Figure 9 we plot the histograms of the common logarithms of the aggregated
inter-trade durations in a whole month.
Appendix C Proof of Proposition 1
We first restate the Theorem 2 in Došlá (2009). It says that for two unimodal distributions f1 and
f2 to be differentiable in the interval [M1,M2], let the function φ(x) = |f
′
1(x)/f
′
2(x)| to be continuous
on (M1,M2) and let limx→M1+ φ(x) = 0 and limx→M2− φ(x) = ∞. Assume that there exist points x1,
x2 such that M1 < x1 < x2 < M2 and function φ is increasing on the interval (M1, x1), decreasing
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Figure 8: Histograms of the common logarithms of the raw inter-trade durations for 25 NASDAQ stocks on January 2nd,
2013.
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Figure 9: Histograms of the common logarithms of the aggregated inter-trade durations in the whole January of 2013 for
25 NASDAQ stocks.
on (x1, x2), and again increasing on (x2,M2). Then a mixture with the density g = pf1 + (1 − p)f2 is
bimodal if and only if p ∈ (p1, p2) where
1
pi
= 1 + φ(xi) for i = 1, 2.
In our model of the mixture of two inverse gaussian, i.e, IV G(µ1, λ1) and IV G(µ2, λ2), we have
f ′k(y) =
[
λk
2π
] 1
2
exp
[
−λk(y − µk)
2
2µ2ky
]
· y−
3
2 ·
[
−λky
2 − 3µ2ky + µ
2
kλk
2µ2ky
2
]
k = 1, 2.
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Then in the interval (M1,M2)
φ(y) =
∣∣∣∣f ′1(y)f ′2(y)
∣∣∣∣ = (λ1λ2
) 3
2
(
µ2
µ1
)2
(y −M1)(y −N1)
(M2 − y)(y −N2)
exp
[(
λ2
2µ22
−
λ1
2µ21
)
y +
λ2 − λ1
2y
+ C
]
,
where C = 2µ1µ2(λ1µ2 − λ2µ1). Clearly limy→M1+ φ(x) = 0 and limy→M2− φ(x) = +∞. And if we take
derivative with respect to φ(y) again, we have
φ′(y) = φ(y) ·
[
µ21λ2 − µ
2
2λ1
2µ21µ
2
2
−
λ2 − λ1
2y2
−
1
y −N2
+
1
y −M1
+
1
y −N1
+
1
M2 − y
]
= φ(y) · R(y).
For the function R(y), we have limy→M1+R(x) = +∞ and limy→M2−R(y) = +∞. If there is point
y⋆ that makes R(y⋆) < 0, then there must exist two roots y1 and y2 for the equation R(y) = 0 such
that M1 < y1 < y2 < M2. So φ
′(y) > 0 for (M1, y1), φ
′(y) < 0 for (y1, y2) and φ
′(y) > 0 for (y2,M2).
Therefore, function φ is increasing on the interval (M1, y1), decreasing on (y1, y2), and again increasing
on (y2,M2). Then as long as p ∈ (p1, p2) where
1
pk
= 1 + φ(yk) for k = 1, 2, the mixture g is bimodal.
Appendix D Maximization in EM and updating parameters
D.1 Estimation for β
From equation 5, by taking first order condition (F.O.C), we have
∂E[l]
∂β12
=
n∑
i=2
[
xi−1 · P(si = 2, si−1 = 1|F)−
eβ
T
12xi−1
1 + eβ
T
12
xi−1
xi−1 · P(si−1 = 1|F)
]
= ~0
which is equivalent to:
n∑
i=2
[
P(si = 2, si−1 = 1|F)−
eβ
T
12xi−1
1 + eβ
T
12
xi−1
· P(si−1 = 1|F)
]
xi−1 = ~0 (18)
As the same, from ∂E[l]
∂β21
= ~0, we have
n∑
i=2
[
P(si = 1, si−1 = 2|F)−
eβ
T
21xi−1
1 + eβ
T
21
xi−1
· P(si−1 = 2|F)
]
xi−1 = ~0 (19)
D.2 Estimation for the distribution parameters
Conditional on state k, inter-trade duration yi follow inverse Gaussian distribution. So
log f(yi|si = k) =
1
2
log
[λk
2π
(
yi
)−3]
−
λk
2µ2k
(
yi − µk)
2(
yi
)
=
1
2
log
(
λk
)
−
1
2
log(2π)−
3
2
log
(
yi
)
−
λk
2µ2k
(yi − µk)
2
yi
, k = 1, 2
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Thus, for the part of likelihood that include distribution parameters in 5,
E
(
n∑
i=1
log f
(
yi
))
= −
n
2
log
(
2π
)
−
3
2
n∑
i=1
log(yi) +
1
2
logλ1 ·
(
n∑
i=1
P(si = 1|F)
)
+
1
2
logλ2 ·
(
n∑
i=1
P(si = 2|F)
)
−
λ1
2µ21
n∑
i=1
(
yi +
µ21
yi
− 2µ1
)
· P(si = 1|F)−
λ2
2µ22
n∑
i=1
(
yi +
µ22
yi
− 2µ2
)
· P(si = 2|F).
Then by taking the F.O.C w.r.t µ1, µ2, λ1, λ2, we get the solution in (7).
Appendix E Calendar effects of inter-trade durations
We divide the market operation hour (9:45 am to 3:45 pm) into 12 half-hour blocks and introduce the
a time-of-day variable zik for the inter-trade duration series. In particular, zik = 1 if the i-th inter-trade
duration is in in the k-th half-hour time block (k = 1, . . . 12), and 0 otherwise. We then regress yi on
the dummy variables zik, i.e., yi =
∑12
k=1 akxik + εi, and obtain the coefficients aˆk. We normalize the
coefficients by their average a˜k =
aˆk
1
12
∑
12
k=1
aˆk
(1 ≤ k ≤ 12) and plot them in Figure 10, which clearly
shows a intra-day calendar effect, i.e., inter-trade durations are shorter at the beginning and the end of
day while longer around the noon. We then calculate the adjusted inter-trade duration by de-trending
the calendar effects.
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Figure 10: A bundle of 25 stocks’ inter-trade duration calendar effects, which are measured for 12 half hour intervals in a
trading day from 9:45am-3:45pm.
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Appendix F Robustness test for the effects of LOB factors
F.1 Analysis in different month
We apply the MF-RSD model (12) to the 25 stocks in a different month, i.e., April 2013, and then
summarize the results of the significance of the 4 LOB factors in Table 11. We can see that the results
are quite similar to what we have obtained for the sample analysis of January 2013. Hence, the roles of
LOB factors in the regime-switching of inter-trade durations are consistent in different periods.
Table 11: Summary of the results for the significance of 4 LOB factors in April 2013.
Stock
Depth Imbalance Price Spread Trade Volume Price Movement
P12 P21 P12 P21 P12 P21 P12 P21
sig(+) sig(-) sig(+) sig(-) sig(+) sig(-) sig(+) sig(-) sig(+) sig(-) sig(+) sig(-) sig(+) sig(-) sig(+) sig(-)
AAPL 0 14 3 1 19 0 0 22 0 21 22 0 22 0 0 15
ALXN 1 2 1 1 8 5 0 20 0 10 18 0 22 0 0 22
AMZN 0 6 6 0 19 2 0 22 0 12 18 0 22 0 0 22
BIDU 1 1 2 2 16 0 0 22 0 14 21 0 22 0 0 22
BMRN 0 3 0 0 11 1 0 21 0 7 9 0 18 0 0 22
CELG 1 7 3 1 13 2 0 22 0 11 20 0 22 0 0 21
CERN 2 1 1 1 7 1 0 17 0 2 5 0 21 0 0 21
CMCSA 0 17 9 0 1 13 0 13 0 16 22 0 15 0 4 0
COST 0 0 0 0 5 5 0 14 0 10 20 0 22 0 0 22
DISCA 0 3 2 1 2 3 0 14 0 11 12 0 19 0 0 21
EBAY 0 13 5 1 2 8 0 19 0 20 22 0 17 0 1 3
FB 1 12 11 0 11 0 0 20 0 6 22 0 17 0 4 0
GOOG 0 6 3 0 21 0 0 22 0 13 21 0 22 0 0 21
INTC 0 22 21 0 1 14 1 1 0 19 22 0 6 5 4 0
ISRG 2 0 0 2 14 0 0 21 3 1 14 0 17 0 0 12
KLAC 0 4 2 1 0 5 0 8 0 7 12 0 20 0 0 20
MAR 0 9 1 0 2 1 0 10 0 11 17 0 14 0 0 8
MSFT 0 22 22 0 0 21 3 5 0 17 22 0 10 0 8 0
NFLX 0 4 5 0 22 0 0 22 0 14 22 0 22 0 0 21
QCOM 0 9 5 3 0 5 0 19 0 21 22 0 21 0 7 2
REGN 0 5 4 0 17 0 0 22 0 2 9 0 22 0 0 20
SBUX 0 8 3 0 1 5 0 10 0 16 22 0 19 0 0 11
TXN 0 16 9 1 0 9 0 12 0 10 22 0 21 0 1 0
VOD 1 13 13 0 7 1 0 12 1 6 21 0 10 1 2 0
YHOO 0 20 19 0 3 2 0 5 0 13 22 0 7 1 5 0
Sum (%) 1.6% 39.5% 27.3% 2.7% 36.7% 18.7% 0.7% 71.8% 0.7% 52.7% 83.5% 0.0% 81.8% 1.3% 6.5% 55.6%
Note: P12 represent the regime switching from the short-duration regime to the long duration regime, and P21 represent the regime
switching from the long regime to the short-duration regime. Significance is measured at the 5% level. Sig(+)/Sig(-) means that
the estimated coefficient for the factor is significantly positive/negative. Each cell shows the significance. We have 22 trading days
in April 2013, so the upper limit for each cell is 22. The last row records the percentage (%) of the times that this factor appears
as significant in all 550 instances (25 stocks times 22 days).
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F.2 Analysis of trades by trading direction
To test if our finding on the informativeness of DI to the price movement, we repeat the analysis in
the previous section to directional trades. We divide the trades into buyer-initiated trades and seller-
initiated trades and then construct the series of inter-trade durations between the pure buy trades and
the series of inter-trade durations between the pure sell trades. Moreover, to gain a clearer insight into
the effect of depth imbalance on the regime-switching probabilities for the directional transactions, we
redefine the order book depth imbalance DI as
DI =
v1b − v
1
a
v1a + v
1
b
.
It is positive if the depth at best bid is greater than the depth at best ask, and it is negative if v1a > v
1
b .
Table 12: Summary of the results for the significance of LOB factors for buy trades.
Stock
DI PS TV PM
P12 P21 P12 P21 P12 P21 P12 P21
sig(+) sig(-) sig(+) sig(-) sig(+) sig(-) sig(+) sig(-) sig(+) sig(-) sig(+) sig(-) sig(+) sig(-) sig(+) sig(-)
AAPL 1 11 12 0 16 0 0 21 0 10 21 0 21 0 3 0
ALXN 3 1 3 0 4 0 0 11 0 4 4 1 19 0 0 20
AMZN 3 1 6 0 11 0 0 19 0 4 10 0 21 0 0 21
BIDU 1 2 4 0 6 1 0 15 0 2 10 0 20 0 0 21
BMRN 0 0 3 1 1 0 0 15 2 1 7 0 15 0 0 14
CELG 0 2 18 0 2 5 0 12 0 9 16 0 21 0 0 21
CERN 0 1 5 0 2 1 0 12 0 5 7 0 20 0 0 18
CMCSA 0 11 19 0 6 1 4 0 3 2 19 0 11 0 0 4
COST 2 2 4 0 3 5 1 7 0 5 18 0 20 0 0 20
DISCA 1 1 2 0 0 2 0 11 0 3 8 1 20 0 0 20
EBAY 8 1 6 1 8 0 0 17 0 2 12 0 20 0 0 13
FB 0 5 10 0 8 1 0 11 2 3 21 0 21 0 0 8
GOOG 1 3 4 0 18 0 0 21 1 4 20 0 21 0 0 15
INTC 0 19 16 0 5 5 7 1 1 2 21 0 4 4 0 0
ISRG 4 0 3 1 5 1 0 13 3 0 8 1 16 0 0 11
KLAC 1 2 6 0 7 3 0 11 4 4 9 0 15 0 0 14
MAR 0 3 9 0 3 1 0 3 1 1 8 0 9 0 0 4
MSFT 0 20 18 0 6 5 8 2 1 1 20 0 3 2 1 0
NFLX 1 6 8 0 11 1 0 20 0 6 17 0 21 0 0 18
QCOM 5 1 10 0 10 1 0 14 0 4 19 0 16 0 0 12
REGN 0 11 14 0 9 0 0 20 1 0 9 0 20 0 0 18
SBUX 0 4 5 0 3 3 0 9 0 5 19 0 16 0 0 8
TXN 0 3 9 0 6 1 1 6 1 1 18 0 16 0 0 6
VOD 0 7 13 0 2 0 1 0 3 0 15 0 11 0 0 0
YHOO 0 16 14 0 8 4 8 0 5 0 18 0 4 1 0 0
Sum (%) 5.9% 25.3% 42.1% 0.6% 30.5% 7.8% 5.7% 51.6% 5.3% 14.9% 67.4% 0.6% 76.4% 1.3% 0.8% 54.5%
Note: P12 represent the regime switching from the short-duration regime to the long duration regime, and P21 represent the
regime switching from the long regime to the short-duration regime. Significance is measured at the 5% level. Sig(+)/Sig(-) means
that the estimated coefficient for the factor is significantly positive/negative. Each cell shows the significance. The data is in the
month of January 2013. We have 21 trading days for each stock, so the upper limit for each cell is 21. The last row records the
percentage (%) of the times that this factor appears as significant in all 525 instances (25 stocks times 21 days).
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The results are summarized in Table 12 and Table 13. Except for DI, the effects of the other 3 LOB
factors are very similar to their effects in the nondirectional trades. Nonetheless, the effect of DI in sell
trades is exactly the opposite of its effect in buy trades, which is similar to the effect in the nondirectional
trades. It means that, when DI plays a significant role, a larger and positive DI (when v1b is much higher
than v1a) would induce a shorter duration for the next buy trade, while a larger and negative DI (when
v1a is much higher than v
1
b ) is going to prompt a shorter inter-trade duration between sell trades. This
finding supports our explanation before and further elucidates the mechanism of DI’s effect. When the
depth at best bid is much higher than the depth at best ask, traders (especially HFTs) in the market
would anticipate that the price will increase, and hence, they would actively buy securities and build a
position to gain profit because of a potential price increase. Similarly, if the depth at best ask is much
higher than the depth at best bid, traders would actively sell shares, as they predict that the price is
probably going to subsequently decrease.
Table 13: Summary of the results for the significance of LOB factors for sell trades.
Stock
DI PS TV PM
P12 P21 P12 P21 P12 P21 P12 P21
sig(+) sig(-) sig(+) sig(-) sig(+) sig(-) sig(+) sig(-) sig(+) sig(-) sig(+) sig(-) sig(+) sig(-) sig(+) sig(-)
AAPL 6 0 0 10 19 0 0 21 0 12 21 0 21 0 1 8
ALXN 0 2 3 3 4 2 0 14 1 6 5 0 21 0 0 21
AMZN 2 1 0 6 11 0 0 20 1 5 12 0 21 0 0 21
BIDU 1 0 1 5 8 2 0 14 0 5 9 0 21 0 0 21
BMRN 0 0 1 3 10 1 0 16 1 2 5 0 14 0 0 12
CELG 5 0 0 19 2 3 2 9 1 6 14 0 21 0 0 21
CERN 1 1 0 4 5 1 0 14 0 3 5 0 21 0 0 18
CMCSA 11 1 0 17 5 0 3 1 1 3 20 0 12 1 0 6
COST 1 1 0 2 1 2 1 10 1 6 18 0 20 0 0 19
DISCA 1 0 0 4 1 4 0 7 0 2 6 0 21 0 0 19
EBAY 2 4 2 7 11 1 0 18 0 6 10 1 20 0 0 12
FB 4 2 0 14 11 2 0 14 4 0 21 0 21 0 1 4
GOOG 5 0 0 8 19 0 0 21 0 3 18 0 21 0 0 17
INTC 18 0 0 18 1 5 5 1 0 2 19 0 4 3 0 0
ISRG 0 3 1 3 11 2 0 17 2 0 5 0 17 0 0 5
KLAC 2 3 1 4 1 2 0 9 2 4 6 0 19 0 0 17
MAR 6 0 0 7 1 5 0 5 0 3 14 0 14 0 1 5
MSFT 20 0 0 19 7 4 11 0 0 1 20 0 3 1 1 0
NFLX 7 0 0 11 12 1 0 19 0 10 15 0 21 0 0 19
QCOM 2 2 0 13 4 1 0 17 0 3 15 0 20 0 0 13
REGN 12 0 0 10 14 1 0 18 2 1 6 1 18 0 0 14
SBUX 5 1 0 5 5 3 0 8 0 7 19 0 17 0 0 13
TXN 7 0 0 11 6 2 0 3 1 1 18 0 11 0 0 3
VOD 3 0 0 8 1 0 1 0 2 0 8 0 7 0 0 0
YHOO 15 0 0 16 7 1 5 0 1 1 18 0 3 2 0 0
Sum (%) 25.9% 4.0% 1.7% 43.2% 33.7% 8.6% 5.3% 52.6% 3.8% 17.5% 62.3% 0.4% 77.9% 1.3% 0.8% 54.9%
Note: P12 represent the regime switching from the short-duration regime to the long duration regime, and P21 represent the
regime switching from the long regime to the short-duration regime. Significance is measured at the 5% level. Sig(+)/Sig(-) means
that the estimated coefficient for the factor is significantly positive/negative. Each cell shows the significance. The data is in the
month of January 2013. We have 21 trading days for each stock, so the upper limit for each cell is 21. The last row records the
percentage (%) of the times that this factor appears as significant in all 525 instances (25 stocks times 21 days).
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F.3 Analysis of DI conditional on the tightness of PS
As we have shown in Section 5, DI is a significant factor for the regime-switching of inter-trade
durations mostly for the stocks that have a very tight price spread. To further test the effect of DI
conditional on the tightness of PS, we add one more factor to our regressions for the stocks whose PS is
not always tight. To see it more clearly, we simply define a dummy variable named IT (Is T ight), which
equals 1 when PS ≤ 0.2 (double of the minimum tick) and 0 when PS > 0.2. Then we add one more
factor, which is an interaction term DI × IT , into the R.H.S. of equation (12). The results are presented
in Table 14, which omits the report of TV and PM , as their effects are almost the same as what they have
in Table 8. From the regression results, we can see that the factor DI is basically insignificant for the
regime switching of inter-trade durations, while in more than half of total instances the factor DI × IT
is significantly negative for P12 and significantly positive for P21. Hence, it supports our explanation
before that the depth imbalance is informative and important to the dynamics of inter-trade durations
only when the price spread is tight, i.e., the greater the depth imbalance is, inter-trade durations will be
more likely to stay in (or switch to) the short-duration regime.
Table 14: Summary of results for the significance of LOB factors in MF-RSD.
Stock
DI PS DI × IT
P12 P21 P12 P21 P12 P21
sig(+) sig(-) sig(+) sig(-) sig(+) sig(-) sig(+) sig(-) sig(+) sig(-) sig(+) sig(-)
AAPL 0 13 1 4 20 0 0 21 0 19 18 0
ALXN 4 0 1 5 5 1 0 15 0 15 15 1
AMZN 1 0 3 0 13 0 0 21 0 14 10 0
BIDU 3 0 1 1 10 2 0 16 0 15 18 0
BMRN 0 0 1 2 6 1 0 17 2 7 12 0
CELG 1 2 3 0 0 2 0 12 1 8 5 3
CERN 1 0 0 2 6 2 0 9 1 10 14 0
COST 3 1 1 1 0 2 0 8 1 8 5 2
DISCA 0 0 0 1 1 2 0 12 1 7 6 5
NFLX 0 6 4 0 13 1 0 21 0 20 10 1
Sum (%) 6.2% 10.5% 7.1% 7.6% 35.2% 6.2% 0.0% 72.4% 2.9% 58.6% 53.8% 5.7%
Note: P12 represent the regime switching from the short-duration regime to the long duration regime, and P21 represent the regime
switching from the long regime to the short-duration regime. Significance is measured at the 5% level. Sig(+)/Sig(-) means that
the estimated coefficient for the factor is significantly positive/negative. Each cell shows the significance. The data is in the month
of January 2013. We have 21 trading days for each stock, so the upper limit for each cell is 21. The last row records the percentage
(%) of the times that this factor appears as significant in total 210 instances (10 stocks times 21 days). From the 25 NASDAQ
stocks, we have selected 10 stocks whose PS vary from being tight to being slack. Here we exclude the stocks that mainly have
PS less than 0.2, i.e., IT equal to 1 for most time, such as CMCSA, EBAY, FB and etc. And we also exclude the stocks GOOG,
ISRG and REGN as their PS are basically greater than 0.2 and have IT = 0 for most time.
40
F.4 Use the aggregated depth imbalance
We have also used the aggregated depth imbalance between the ask-side and the sell-side instead of
DI between the best ask and the best bid in the regression model (12). The aggregated depth imbalance
is defined as ADI =
|v1−5
a
−v1−5
b
|
|v1−5a +v
1−5
b
|
, where v1−5a (v
1−5
b ) is the cumulative depth from the first to the fifth
ask (bid) price. Table 15 shows the regression results. We can see that, besides the similarity effects
of the other 3 factors, ADI is less commonly significant for the regime-switching probabilities than DI.
Even for the stocks which have very tight price spread, ADI doesn’t show a very common effect on the
regime switchings. Therefore, it demonstrates that ADI is less informative and traders may not treat it
as an effective indicator for their trading strategies, compared with DI.
Table 15: Summary of results for the significance of LOB factors in MF-RSD.
Stock
ADI PS TV PM
P12 P21 P12 P21 P12 P21 P12 P21
sig(+) sig(-) sig(+) sig(-) sig(+) sig(-) sig(+) sig(-) sig(+) sig(-) sig(+) sig(-) sig(+) sig(-) sig(+) sig(-)
AAPL 0 9 4 0 21 0 0 21 0 11 21 0 21 0 9 0
ALXN 3 2 0 1 6 0 0 20 0 10 10 1 20 0 0 21
AMZN 1 7 3 1 17 0 0 21 0 8 15 0 21 0 0 21
BIDU 2 2 0 1 13 0 0 19 0 5 16 0 21 0 0 21
BMRN 1 2 1 2 8 1 0 21 0 6 12 0 14 0 0 12
CELG 1 0 4 0 4 2 0 15 0 12 20 0 21 0 0 21
CERN 2 0 0 0 8 0 0 17 0 4 9 0 21 0 0 20
CMCSA 0 13 8 1 3 4 0 7 0 12 20 0 12 0 4 0
COST 1 1 0 0 4 4 0 14 0 12 20 0 21 0 0 21
DISCA 0 5 2 0 2 1 0 17 0 6 17 0 19 0 0 19
EBAY 0 10 0 3 11 0 0 21 0 16 20 0 20 0 0 3
FB 4 5 3 3 16 2 0 21 0 16 21 0 20 0 9 0
GOOG 0 3 4 0 21 0 0 21 0 12 20 0 21 0 0 18
INTC 0 12 6 0 3 7 1 5 0 11 20 0 3 5 5 0
ISRG 2 2 3 0 10 3 0 20 5 0 11 0 18 0 0 13
KLAC 1 2 1 0 5 3 0 17 0 8 15 0 12 0 0 11
MAR 1 3 1 0 2 4 0 12 0 6 17 0 11 0 1 5
MSFT 0 15 9 0 5 7 0 5 0 7 20 0 2 2 5 0
NFLX 1 2 1 1 14 1 0 21 0 12 19 0 21 0 0 18
QCOM 0 8 1 2 6 1 0 20 0 17 21 0 16 0 3 6
REGN 1 2 2 1 17 0 0 21 3 0 8 0 21 0 0 19
SBUX 0 5 6 0 2 4 0 15 0 17 21 0 12 0 0 3
TXN 1 7 1 0 4 1 0 8 0 8 21 0 10 0 1 1
VOD 0 6 6 4 6 0 0 5 2 0 17 0 18 0 1 0
YHOO 0 10 2 2 7 3 1 5 0 8 21 0 3 3 6 0
Sum (%) 4.2% 25.3% 13.0% 4.2% 41.0% 9.1% 0.4% 74.1% 1.9% 42.7% 82.3% 0.2% 76.0% 1.9% 8.4% 48.2%
Note: P12 represent the regime switching from the short-duration regime to the long duration regime, and P21 represent the
regime switching from the long regime to the short-duration regime. Significance is measured at the 5% level. Sig(+)/Sig(-) means
that the estimated coefficient for the factor is significantly positive/negative. Each cell shows the significance. The data is in the
month of January 2013. We have 21 trading days for each stock, so the upper limit for each cell is 21. The last row records the
percentage (%) of the times that this factor appears as significant in all 525 instances (25 stocks times 21 days).
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F.5 Use a dummy variable for the increase in price spread
In this part, we use a dummy variable for the increase in price spread instead of PM in the regression
model (12). We compare the PS at i − 1 and i to see whether it has increased, and the variable is
defined as PSIi = 1 if PSi > PSi−1 and 0 otherwise. It may have some overlap with PM , but some
increases may result from order cancellations between trades, rather than the elimination of the existing
best ask or the best bid by an incoming trade, which induces the mid-price movement. From the results
shown in Table 16, we find that in more than 70% of total instances, the effect of PSI is significantly
positive for P12, which is almost the same as the effect of PM . So it supports our explanation that the
increase in PS is a driving force for inter-trade duration switching from the short-duration regime to the
long-duration regime when PM = 1. However, PSI doesn’t show a common significant impact on P21,
which means that when the market is in the long-duration regime in which HFTs mainly adopt a passive
market making strategy, an increase of price spread seems don’t have a significant influence to them.
Table 16: Summary of results for the significance of LOB factors in MF-RSD.
Stock
DI PS TV PSI
P12 P21 P12 P21 P12 P21 P12 P21
sig(+) sig(-) sig(+) sig(-) sig(+) sig(-) sig(+) sig(-) sig(+) sig(-) sig(+) sig(-) sig(+) sig(-) sig(+) sig(-)
AAPL 0 14 1 2 21 0 0 21 0 12 21 0 21 0 1 2
ALXN 3 1 2 6 5 0 0 19 0 11 13 0 21 0 0 16
AMZN 0 3 2 0 16 0 0 21 0 11 18 0 21 0 0 16
BIDU 1 0 1 0 12 1 0 18 0 4 19 0 21 0 0 17
BMRN 0 0 3 0 8 1 0 20 0 6 13 0 17 0 0 5
CELG 0 4 6 0 3 3 0 17 0 13 21 0 21 0 0 10
CERN 1 0 1 1 7 0 0 19 0 4 12 0 21 0 0 9
CMCSA 0 17 19 0 1 14 0 8 0 15 21 0 19 0 4 0
COST 2 1 1 0 4 2 0 18 0 11 21 0 21 0 0 9
DISCA 0 2 1 0 3 3 0 20 0 9 18 0 19 0 0 7
EBAY 1 3 0 5 9 1 0 21 0 16 20 0 21 0 2 0
FB 0 11 1 2 14 3 0 21 0 16 21 0 21 0 6 0
GOOG 2 6 2 1 21 0 0 21 0 13 20 0 21 0 0 13
INTC 0 21 18 0 0 17 2 2 0 13 21 0 4 2 3 0
ISRG 1 1 0 3 10 2 0 19 7 0 12 0 21 0 0 5
KLAC 0 5 2 1 4 4 0 19 0 9 15 0 16 0 0 0
MAR 0 10 4 0 1 4 0 16 0 9 18 0 11 0 2 0
MSFT 0 20 20 0 1 17 2 3 0 13 20 0 6 0 3 0
NFLX 0 6 7 0 13 1 0 21 0 13 20 0 21 0 0 10
QCOM 0 9 4 0 5 3 0 21 0 19 21 0 21 0 2 0
REGN 0 12 9 0 17 0 0 20 1 0 12 0 20 0 0 9
SBUX 0 13 4 0 1 6 0 18 0 17 21 0 17 0 0 0
TXN 0 12 8 0 0 3 0 13 0 11 21 0 12 0 1 0
VOD 0 17 17 0 1 3 0 2 1 1 19 0 16 0 1 0
YHOO 0 21 19 0 1 9 2 1 0 12 21 0 5 1 4 0
Sum (%) 2.1% 39.8% 29.0% 4.0% 33.9% 18.5% 1.1% 76.0% 1.7% 49.1% 87.4% 0.0% 82.9% 0.6% 5.5% 24.4%
Note: P12 represent the regime switching from the short-duration regime to the long duration regime, and P21 represent the
regime switching from the long regime to the short-duration regime. Significance is measured at the 5% level. Sig(+)/Sig(-) means
that the estimated coefficient for the factor is significantly positive/negative. Each cell shows the significance. The data is in the
month of January 2013. We have 21 trading days for each stock, so the upper limit for each cell is 21. The last row records the
percentage (%) of the times that this factor appears as significant in all 525 instances (25 stocks times 21 days).
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